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AFGHANISTAN
AND THE

ANGLO-RUSSIAN DISPUTE.

THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA.

INuniversal history there is no more interesting subject
for the consideratioir of t h c political student than the
record of Russian progress through Central Asia.
In one scnsc this advance is a practical reestablishment
or extension of t l ~ cinfluence of the Aryan race in countries long dominated by peoplcs of Turlci or Mongolian
origin; in another sense it has resulted in a transition
from the barbarism or rude fo1.m~ of Asiatic Iife to the
enlightenment and higher moral development of a European age. In a religious sense it embodies a crusade
against Oriental fanaticism ; and it is a curious feature of
the Anglo-Russian dispute, that upon a question of temporal gain, t h e greatest Christian nation finds itself allied
with the followers of Buddha and Mahomet against Russia
under t h e Banner of the Cross.
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APGHA NISTAN.

T h e descendants of the grcat Peter have opened up in
Central Asia a new regioil whicll, if as yet it has not been
l 1 made to blossom as thc rosc," has nevertheless profited by
tile introduction of law, order, and a certain amount of
industrial prosperity.
Russia cornmenccd her relations with Central Asia as
early as the sixtecnth century. Not only through embassies sent, but by military expeditions ; these, however, at
that time were private ventures by roving Cossacks and
other inhabitants of Southern Russia. Authorized government expeditions commenced with Peter the Great,
who in 1716-17 sent two exploring parties illto the Central
Asia11 deserts-13eltovitch t o IChiva, and Liltl~areffto the
Black Irtish. These expeditions were undertalten in search
of gold, supposed t o cxist in those regions, but failed in their
object ; t h e detachment under Beltovitch being entirely
dcstroyed after reaching IChiva. Peter next turncd his
attention to the countiy bordering upon the southern
shores of the Caspian S e a ; taking advantage of Persian
embarrassments, with t h c consent of the Shah and of the
Sultan he acquired, in 1722-3, the provinccs of Gilan,
Mazanderan, and Asterabad; but the great cxpense of
maintaining a large garrison so remote from Russia, ancl
the unhealthiness of t h e locality, induced thc Russian
Government, in 1732, to restore the districts to Persia.
In the same year Abul-Khair, the I<han of the Little
Kirghiz Horde, voluntarily submitted to Russia. Twenty
years later a small strip of the kingdom of Djungaria, on
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the Irtish, was absorbed, and toward the coinmcncement
of thc reign of Catharine II., Russian authority was assertecl and maiiltainecl over thc broad tract from the AItai
to the Caspian. This occupation was limited to a linc of
outposts along the Ural, thc Irtish, and in thc intervening
district. During Catharine's reign the frontier ilomads
became reduced in numbers, by the cleparturc from the
stcppe between the Ural and Volga of the Calmucl<s,who
flecl into Djungaria, and were nearly destroyed on the
road, by the I<irghiz.
The connection between Russia and Central Asia at
this time assumed another character, that of complete
tranquillity, in consequence of the dcvelopinent of trade
through Orenburg and t o sotne extent through Troitsk
and Pctropaulovslt. The lines along the Ural and 11-tish
gradually acquired strength; the robbcr-raids into European Russia and Western Sibel-ia almost entirely ceasing.
Thc allegigncc of the Icirghiz of the Little and Central
Hordes was expressed in the fact that their Ichans were
always selected undcr Russian influence and from time to
timc appeared at St. Petersburg to render homage. With
the Central Asian Ithanates there was no connection except that of trade,but as regarded the Turcomans, who, it
is said, had frequently aslted for Russian protection, intercourse was discouraged, as they could not be trusted
"within the lines," being simply bandits.
The Emperor Paul imagined that the steppes offered a
good road to Southern Asia, and desiring to expel the
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English from India, in the year I 800 he despatched a large
numbcr of Don C O S S ~ C ~under
~ S , Orloff, through tllc
districts of the Littlc I-Iordc. A t tllc time a treaty was
concluded with Napoleon, then First Consul, by virtue
of which a combiilcd Russo-Frcnch army was t o discm.
bark a t Astcrabad and march froin thence illto India by
way of IChorassan a11d Afghanistan. T h c death of the
Ernperor of Russia put an end t o this plan.
During the reign of Alexander I., Central Asia was
suffered to rcst, and even the Chinese made raids into
Russian territorywithout interruption. In thc third decade
of the present century, however, several advanced military
settlements of Cossacks were founded. "Thus," says M.
Veniul;off, "was inaugurated t h e policy which afterward
guided us in the stcppe, the foundation of advanced
settlements and towns (at first forts, afterwards sta7zitsas*)
until the most advanced of them touches some natural
barrier."
About 1840, it was discovered that t h e system of
military colonization was morc effectual in preserving
order in the Orenburg district than by flying detachments
sent, as occasion required, f~ om Southcrn Russia ; and
in 1845-6 thc orenburg and Ural (or Targai and Irgiz)
forts were established. In 1846 t h c Great ICirghiz
I-Iorde acknowledged ils subjcctinn t o Russia o n the
farthcr side of the Ballcash, tvhilc a t t h e same time a fort
was constructcd on the lower Yaxartes.

* Cossaclc settlements.
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I n 1847 the encroachlnents of Russia in Central Asia
had brought her upolr the borders of the important
khanates of IChiva and Kholcand, and, like some huge
,boa-constrictor, she prepared to swallow them. I n 1852
the inevitable military expedition was followed by the
customaly perrnallc~ltpost. Another row of forts was
planted on the Lower Yaxartes, and in 1854 far t o t h e
eastward, in the midst of t h e Great Horde, was built Fort
Vernoye-the foundation of a new lime, more or less contiguous t o natural boundaries (motntains and rivers), but
not a close line. Between Perovslcy and Vernoye there
were upwards of four hundred and fifty miles of desert
open t o the incursions of brigands, and between t h c Aral
and Caspian seas there was a gap, two hundred miles in
width, favorable for raids into the Orenburg Steppe from
the side of I<hivn. Finally, under the pretext of closing
this gap, a general convergent movement of the Siberian
and Orcnburg forces commenced, culminating under General Tchernayeff in the capture of Aulieata and Chemlcent
in 1864, and of Tashkent in 1865.
Here, M.Veniulcoff says : "The Government intended
to halt in its conquests, and, limiting itself t o forming
a closed line oil the south of the Kirghiz steppes, left
it t o thc sedentary inhabitants of Tashkent t o form a
separate khanate from the Kholtand so I~ostilet o us."
And this historian tells us that t h e Tashkendees declined
the honor of becoming the Czar's policemen in this way,
evidently foreseeing t11e end, and, t o cut t h e matter short,
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chose the Russian general, Tchernayeff, as their Ichan.
Thc fcw Central Asian rulers whose necks had so far
escaped the Muscovite heel, made an ineffectual resistancc, and in 1866 I-Iocljeni and Jizalch wcre duly
"aiinexcd," thus separating Bokhara and I<hol\rand.
Here we inay glance at the tnethod by which Russia
took firmer root on the shores of the Caspian, and established a comn~ercial linlc with the IChivan rcgion. In
1869 a military post and seaport was planted at Krasnovodsk, on that point Bf thc east shore of the Caspian,
which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as
a base of operations against the Turcomans, who were at
I

I

I

1'

that time very troublesome. Several military expcditions set out from this point, and every year dctachmcnts
of troops were despatched to keep the roads open toward
Ichiva, the Icepet Dagh, or the banlrs of the Attrelc.
Within five years (1870-'7s) the ilomads living within
the routes named had become "good Turcomans," carried the Czar's mails to Ichiva, and furnished the Icrasnovodsk-I<hivan caravans with camels and drivers. But t h e
colonizatioil scheme on the lower Caspian had once more
brought the ~ u s s i a h to
s the Persian boundary. In 1869 the
Shah had been rather officiouslyassured that Russia urould
not think of going below the line of the Attrelc ; yet, as
Colonel Veniulcoff shows, she now regrets having cornmitted herself, and urges " geographical ignorance " of
the locality wheil the assurance was given, and the fact
that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass
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eight months of the year in Russian territoi-y aild four in
" so-called " Pelria ; i t is therefore ~ ~ difficult
o t
to imagine
the probable change on the map of that quarter.
The march continuecl towarcl Ichiva, and after t h e usual
iron-hand-in-velvet-glove introduction, General I<aufmaizn
in 1573 pounced upon that important khanate, and thus.
added anotller to the jewels of the Empire. Nominally,
Ichiva is indcpcndent, but nevertheless collects ancl pays
to Russia a consiclerable contribution annually.
In 1868 Russia seized Sainarcand, a ~ i destablished over
the lchanate of Bolthara a similar supervision t o t h a t in
Ichiva. A s the distinguished Russian alrcady quoted
remarlcs : " T h e programme of thc political existence of
Bolcliara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to her by
us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, wliich
defined her subordinate relation to Russia. But n o one
1001~sat these acts as the treaties of an equal with an
equal. They are instructions in a polite form, or programmes given by t h e civilized conqueror t o t h e conquered barbarians, and the execution of ivhich is guaranteed by the immediate presence of a military force."
T h e district of IChokand, whose ruler, Ichudoyar Khan,
submitted himself to Russia in 1867, was lor a number of
years nominally independent, but becoming disturbed by
domestic dissensions, was uItimatcly annexed uncIer the
name of the Fergana Province.
T o this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's account of the Russian advance. I t will doubtless interest
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the reader to continue the narrative from an English
view, exceptionally accurate and dispassionate in its
naturc.
I n a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution in London, May IG, 1884, Lieut.-General Sir Edward
Hamley, of the British Army, discussed the Central Asia11
question before an audience comprising such India11
experts as Sir Ilenry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished
officers, iilcludi~lgLord Chelmsforcl, Sir F. I-Iaines, and
Colonel Malleson. Among other things, General Hamley
said :
"Probably England has never been quite free, during
the present century, from some degree of anxiety caused
by the steady, gradual approaches of Russia through
Central Asia, toward India. I t was seen that where her
foot was planted it never went back. I t was seen that
with forces comparatively small she never failed t o effect
any conquest she was bent 011, and that the conquest,
once effected, was final. This security in possession was
owing in grcat measure t o the fact t h a t the governments
she displaced were bad governn~ents,and that she substituted one far better in itself and of a simplicity which was
well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing.
She aimed mainly a t three things-the establisllment of
order and of confidence and t h e obtaining of some rcturn
for her own heavy expenses. F r o m t h e establishment of
order and of confidellce sprang a prosperity which en-

.
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abled her t o obtain a certain revenue, though entirely
inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we bcheld her
pressing solidly on, and we knew not where she might
stop. Prctexts, such as it was difficult t o find a flaw in,
were never wanting on yhich to ground a fresh absorption
of territory. And seeing behind this advance a vast
country-almost
a continent-which was not merely a
great Asiatic Power, but a great European Statc, under
autocratic, irrcspoi~siblerule, wit11 interests toucl~illgours
at many points, it is not t o be wondered at that we
watched with anxiety her progress as she bore steadily
down toward our Indian frontier."
General Hamlcy says that England became particularly
suspicious of Russia in I 867 wheil she absorbed Tsrkcstan, and this feeling mas intensified in 1878, while the
Treaty of Berlin was still pending. Gcneral Icaufmann
assembled a small army of about rz,ooo men and thirtytwo guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon
the signing of the treaty all threatening movements
ceased, yet the British commander then operating in
Afghanistan kncw that Kaufmann had proposed to marc11
in the direction of Kabul, and menace the British frontier.
I t has ever beell the practice of Russia, in her schemes
of aggrandizement, to combine her diploinatic with her
military machinery ; but, unlike other nations, the ambassador has generally been subordinate to the general.
A t the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword
under the influence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there

A FGHA NISTA N.

remained another representative of Russia-General
Stolietoff-who had been quietly negotiating with the
Ameer of Afghailistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a " Russian
treaty," whose characteristics have already been described.
I-Iearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Peters.
burg questioned the Russian Minister, who answered hiin
"that no mission had been, nor was intended to be,
sent to Kabul, eitllcr by the linperial Governineilt or
by General I<aufinann." This denial was given on July
3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started
froin Samarcand. After the envoy's arrival a t Kabul,
another remonstrance met with thc reply that thc mission
was " of a professional nature and one of simple courtesy,"
and was not, therefore, illconsistent with the pacific assurances already given. T h e real nature of this mission became kilowil from papers foulld by General Roberts at
Kabul in 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had beell
invited to form a close alliance with the Russian Govcrnment. General I<aufmann had advisecl Shcre Ali to try
and stir up disaffection among the Queen's Indian subjects, promising to aicl him, eventually, with troops. Finding that this scheme was impracticable a t the moment,
Russia dropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his
misfortunes, and died soon after.
For the moment England breathed more frccly. There
were still great natural obstacles between the empires of
Russia and of India. Not only the friendly state of Afghanistan, but on its northwestern border the neutral
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territory of Merv, hitherto an independent province, and
inllabitcd by warlike tribes of Turcotnans difficult t o reach
through their deserts and likely to harass a Russiail
advance to Herat to an embarrassing cxtcnt. I t was seen
that the possession of this territory would at once free
Russia from much difficulty in case of an advance and
give her the means of threatening I-Ierat as well as Kabul
from her base in Turltestan, and evcn to some extent t o
carry forward that base beyond the Oxus.
On the part of Russia, the success of General Skobeleff
in capturing thc fortified position of Geok TCpC, January
24, 1880, marlted thc beginning of negotiations with the
Turcolnans for tlle acquisition of Merv. For a long while
these were unsuccessful, but early in 1884 it was cabled
to Lonclon, that "The Queen of the World " had accepted
the White Czar as her future liege lord.
The immediate cause of this event was the effcct produced upon the minds of the Turcoman deputation t o
Moscow by the spectacle of the Czar's coronation. The
impression created by the gorgeous ceremonial was
heightened by the presence of so many Asiatic chiefs and
kinglets at the ancient and historic capital of Russia. T h e
tales they brought back were well calculated to influence
the minds of a wild and primitive people ; and when the
Khan of IChiva proffered his services for the settlement of
their rclations with Russia, that scction of the Teltke tribe
in favor of peate accepted them. The chiefs tendered
their formal submission to the Czar, and promised t o
allow Russian merchants to reside among them, and
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pledged themselves to maintain the security of the
routes from the Oxus to the Tcjend ; also accepting the
responsibilities of Russian subjects by rendering tribute
either in money or by military service. T o all intents and
purposes it is equivalent t o the establisllmcnt of a Russian
garrison in Merv.
Tlle thorough way in w l ~ i c lRussia
~
seeks to bind her
Asiatic subjects is sllown in the fact that in 1884, at the
rcqucst of the I<han of I<l~iva,a Russian tutor was selected
to instruct his children.
Soon after it was reported that the Russians had
established themselves a t Saraklls on the direct road to
EIerat and just ovcr the Persian boundary of Afghanistan.
These later movements again aroused the distrust of
England, and a joint commission of Russian and English
officials was appointed early in the year I 885.
While the English inembers of the commission under
Sir Peter Lutnsdcn were awaiting the convenience of their
foreign colleagues, the presence of Russian troops was
reported on the disputed territory in the vicinity of I-Ierat.
i This action alarmed the Afghans, and a collision seemed
imminent. T h e English Government considered M. de
Giers' explanation of this encroacl~mcntunsatisfactory.
Pending an adjustment of the new complication both
nations prepared for the worst.
Here we will leavc the subject of the Russian advance
through the Gates of Asia and pass to the consideration
of the present neutral ground of Afghanistan.
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ON THE THRESI-IOLD O F INDIA.

,

F r o m t h e Amu Daria and the Turcornail steppcs t o tile
descrts of Bcloochistan, f?om Persian I<horassan t o the
valley of the Indus, stretches thc coulltry of thc Afghans.
Men of renown and evcnts of world-wide interest have
been conncctcd with its history. I t s records tell of the
murder of Cavagnari in recent tiincs; of the tragedy of
Elphinstone's colnlnand (1838-42); of Shah Nadir, the
butcher of Delhi (1738-39) ; of Baber Ichali, the founder
of Mongolian rule in India (1520); of Timul-, the assailer
of t h e world (1398) ; of Genghiz Khan, the a~lllihilatorof
t h e civilization of ancient Asia (1218-24); of the great
ruler, Sultan Mahmoud (A. D. 1000) ; and yet earlier, of
Alexander, " the divincly favored Maceclonian." Afghan
history dies away, in thc hymns of the Iildiail Vedas, eight e e n hundred years before t h e birth of Christ.
T h e territory of Afghanistan--which is dcstined to be
t h e arena of a great international duel-covers an area of
12,000 square milcs, or a tract measuring from north t o
s o u t h 688 miles, and from east to west 736 milcs. I t is a
m o u i ~ t a i i ~ o ucountry
s
; a high plateau, 6,000 fcct above
t h e sea, ovcrloolted by lofty inountain rai~geswhich open
o u t and sink toward the west and soutl~. On the north
I3
D

I

it is bordered by thc western ranges of the Himalayas,
which reach to thc Amu Daria; by the wall-lilte range of
the Hindu I c ~ s h ,some of whosc peaks are rg,ooo feet
high ; and by several sinallcr ridges. Betwcen the Icabul
and Icuram rivers rises the snow-capped Sufeid Icoh, the
principal peak of which, t o the south of Jelalabad, attains
an altitude of 15,000 fcet. TOthe south of this, in Southern Afghanistan, t11c Suleiman range, of an average height
of 9,000 feet, falls rapidly toward thc valley of t h e Indus.
Between the Hindu Itash and the Suleiman ranges there
are several lesser oncs stretching toward the southwest,
including the Auran Mountains (7,000 feet).
Of the principal rivers noted here (the Helmund, I-Iari-Rrfd, Kabul, Icuram, and the Gomal) the Ilelmund
alone is navigable. T h e Helmund terminates in the
swamps of Seistan, as also do t h e Kas11, Farrah, and
Herat rivers, running parallel to the I-Ielmund across the
Icandahar-Hcrat roads, a t 80, I 50, and zoo miles, respectively, to the west of it. These rivers are without bridges,
but (with the exception of the Helmund-provided wit11
ferry at Girishk) are fordable, save in the months of April
and May. T h e country is othcrwisc open and easily
traversable, but only on the main routes can water be
readily obtained, and forage is scarce in the minter.
T h e Turnulc valley, running northeast from Icandallar,
is followed by the great route to Ghazni and Kabul skirting
the Guilcok range-separated from the Hazaristan to its
west by the parallel valley of the Argandab. T h e latter
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valley is also followcd by a routc which enters it from
Mooldur, the source of tlle Turnuk. This debouches
upon the Ilerat road abqut ten iniles west of ICandahar,
and there is no coinmunicatioil west of it bctwccn Herat
ancl Kabul, save by impracticable mountain routes across
the I-Iazaristan.
Threc routes from ICandahar t o Herat separate a t
Girishkon the Helmund, cross the ICash at diffcrcnt points,
and meet at Sabzawar (280 rniles from ICai~dahar)011 t h e
Herat ; both of the soutl~crnmostpassing by thc town of
Farrali, which is 230 miles from ICandal~ar. From Girishk
also a road follows the Helmund to Seistail and Lasb
Jowain, where it joins the I-Ierat road at Farrah o n the
river of that nainc, or at Sabzawar on the Herat. T l ~ e
southernmost of the routcs to Farrah also brancl~esfrom
ICash down the river named Rash, joining the Seistan
route a t Lash.
T h e general aspect of Afghanistan is that of a series of
elevated flat-bottomed valleys, in the vicinity of t h e
streams, sorncwhat under cultivation. T h e scenciy is
often wild and beautiful, and soine of the defiles t o the
north of the Iliildu Itash are said to bc of appalling
grandcur, while the soft, still loveliness of the sheltered
glcns on the southern slope of that range strongly impresses
the traveller who visits them. Soine of the ranges in the
north and northeast are well tiinbered with pine and oak.
T h e eastern half of Afghanistan is generally cold and
rugged, but sustains innumerable floclcs and herds, and
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abounds in mineral wealth, especially lead and sulphur.
I n the more sheltered valleys considerable fruit is grown,
but only grain enough for the actual consumption of the
inhabitants. Water and fodder abound, but 'fuel is de6cient ; a serious matter, as the cold in the winter is extreme.
The western part of Afghanistan is a more fertile region,
interspersed, it is truc, with lofty rangcs, but comprising
many pleasant valleys and pastures.
The population is approximately estimated at eight
millions. Afghanistan is a genuine society of different
nations, although the greater part are of Persian descent.
Tlle strongholds of the German self-protecting federations ai-c here produccd on a large scale.
Thus the Duranis, Tajilcs, Yusafzais, Ghilzais, Eim$~lcs,
Hazaris, [(affirs, I-Iindus, Jats, Arabs, I<izilbashis, Uzbclcs,
Biluchis, are near neighbors; of thesc about 3,000,000
may be real Alghans who profess the Suni faith and spcalc
Inclo-Persian Puclitu. There are over four hundred
inferior tribes ltnown. The Duranis are numerically
strongest and live in the vicinity of I<andahar. Next in
importance are the Ghilzais, estimated at 30,000 fighting
men living in the triangle-Kabul, Jelalabad, Iihelat-iGhilzai ; until 1747 they furnished the rulers of Afghanistan. T o the south of the Gbilzais live the Puchtuspeaking races who chiefly defend only their own territory;
the mou~ltainous eastern border is inhabited by thc
Momunds, Afridis, Aralczais, Zymukts, Waziris, who have
never been subdued. Their sense of independence, how-
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ever, does not prevent them from selling their frieildship
for ready inoney to the highest bidder. On the waterof the Helmund and Indus dwell the independent
Pathails and Biluchis. The Persian-spcalring I<izilbashis
in Icabul, comprise 3,000,000 of Shiahs, who are ilot
Afghans, many of whose 30,000 fighting men are in the
Ameer's regular army. The Tajilcs-about IO,OOOmen
-are chiefly in the Kabul and Ghazni districts. The
Hazaris and EimAks are in the central section of Afghanistan, ltnown as the Hazaristan, cxtending east and west
from the I<oushan pass over the Hindu-ICtish range to
Marchat on the Turcoman frontier, and north and south
from Sirpool in Turltestan to Girishk, between ICandal~ar
and Herat; they are the descendants of the military
settlers left by the Tartar hordes that swept Central
Asia under' Geilghiz Khan, and still maintain a quasiindependence ; they cordially detest the Afghan Government, but pay an annual tribute in money to its support.
Finally there is a million of foreign nationalities, including
Turks, Persians, Indians, Armenians, and Icaffirs ; the lastnamed are I-Iindus, and violent antagonists of the Mohammedans living around them.
Thus it is seen that modern Afghanistan comprises
three great districts-Herat
in the west, Kabul in the
east, and Icandahar in the centre, with the seat of government at the cities of the same names respectively.
Within each district are, as already described, a large
number of tribes occupyiilg sub-districts, closely connected
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like the cells of a honey-comb, but each with its destine.,
tive manners and customs and irregular military forces, in
no instance numbering lcss than 6,000 men, and often
twice that number, divided about equally into horse and
e
foot. Many of these render militaiy scrvicc to t l ~ Amcer,
many are bandits in the worst sense. The notnadic
tribes-like the EimAlts peopling the Heratic region-live
principally in tents, encamping in winter in thc valleys,
and in suinmer on the,table-lands of the mountain ranges.
They are ignorant, hospitable, and brave and ardent
hunters. Their principal trade is with Herat, and consists of woollen and camel-hair fabrics and clarified
butter.
The farming population all live in small hamlets. The
better classes of these live in villages surrounding or joined
to the castle of a Khan. Thcse castles are encompassed
by a rude wall, having frequently turrets at the corners,
and occasionally armed with swivel-guns or wall-pieces.
The principal gardens are always on the outsidc of the
castle, and the herds of horses and camels belonging to
the Khan are kept at distant pastures and attended by
herders, who live in tents. In the Bori and Ghazgar valleys the houscs are of wood. In the Ghazgar valley they
are all fortified, as already described ; the doors are generally mere man-holes, and the top of the towers are loopholes. The better class, and more modern of these, have
flat roofs, from which the water is carried by spouts; the
walls surrounding are at least twelve feet high, and cover
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nearly an acre of ground. Three or four such houses
usually constitute a village. These semi-barbarians are
noted forthe length and ferocity of their feuds. Sometimes
two branches of a family w11o are neighbors become enemies.
The distance between their " fortlets " may be two hundred ~ a r d s and
, on that space no one ventures. They go
out at opposite gates and wallc straight from their own
fort in a line protected by its walls from thc fire of the
othcr, until out of range, then they turn around to their
fields. Broadfoot relates that " once in Zarmat I saw a
fort shut by rolling a stone against the door, instead of with
the usual heavy chain. On inquiring as to the cause of
such carelessness, the Malik, a fine old man with a plump,
good-humored face, stretched his arms out toward the
line of distant forts, ancl said: ' I have not an enemy! '
I t was a pleasing exception to the rule."
These feuds are a system of pctty warfare, carried on
by long shots, stealing cattle, and burning crops. Samson,
burning his neighbor's corn, acted just like an Afghan.
When the harvest is nearly ripe, neither party dare sleep.
T h e remedy is sometimes for both t o fight until an equal
number are killed on each side, when the neighbors step
in and effect a reconciliation ; another method is to pay
forfeit of a feast and some shcep or cloth ; in exceptional
cases, a few Afghan virgins are substitutcd for the sheep,
but they are given in marriage, and are well treated.
Our space does not permit an extended reference to
the manners and customs of this primitive people but a
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few characteristics m a y be briefly noted. T h e love of
war is felt much more among Afghans than by other
Eastern peoples, although but little effort has been made
by them to augment t h e means of resistance and aggression. Pillage, fighting, and disturbances are a t times
necessary to their very existence, and are followed by long
days of idleness, during which they live on the fruits of
their depredations. There is no shade of difference
between the character of the nomad and t h e citizen; a
town life does not soften their habits; they live there as
they live in a tent, armed to the teeth and ready for the
onslaught. Though full of duplicity, one is nevertheless
liable to be talcen in by their apparent frankness. They
are hospitable to strangers, but only bccause this is an
ancient custom which has t h e force of law and is not a
virtue which springs from t h e heart. T h e pride of the
Afghans is a marked feature of their national character,
They boast of their descent, their prowess in arms, their
independence; and cap all by "An1 I not a Puktan?"
The Afghan people, occupied with the defence of their
homes, have failed t o assist the Ameer in t h e formation
and maintenance of t h a t indispensable instrument-an
organized, well-equipped, easily mobilized army. I n regular battle the Afghans can have but little hope of success ; their strength lies in the petty warfare peculiar to a
wild, mountainous country. As auxiliaries, as partisan
troops in their own country, they would be of great value
to their allies and extremely troublesome t o their enemies.
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For outpost, courier, and scouting purposes, they would
doubtless be most efficient. The strength of the organized army in the service of the Ameer of Afghanistan is
about 50,000 men of all arms. T h e traveller VdmbCry,
who visited Herat in 1863, says :
" T h e Afghan's national costume consists of a long
shirt, drawers, and dirty linen clothes ; or, if he is a soldier, he affects a British red coat. H e throws it over his
shirt, while he gets on his head the picturesque IndoAfghan turban. Others again-and these are the drazrmonde-are wont to assume a half-Persian costume. Weapons are borne by all. Rarely does any one, whether civil
or military, enter the bazar without his sword and shield.
T o be quite h In ?fzode one must carry about one quite an
arsenal, consisting of two pistols, a sword, poniard, handjar, gun, and shield." M. VAmbCry also describes a drill
of some Afghan regulars.
" The men had a very military bearing, far better than
the Ottoman army that was so drilled forty years ago.
These might have been mistalcen for European troops if
most of them had not had on their bare feet the pointed
Icabuli shoe, and had not had their short trowsers so
tightly stretched by their straps that they threatened
every moment t o burst and fly up above the knee."
The adventurous O'Donovan thus describes an Afghan
cavalrymail whom he met unexpectedly, near Herat, in
1880: " H e wore a dark-colored turban, one end of the
cloth pulled up in front so as t o resemble a small cockade.
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His uniform was blue-black, and he wore long boots. fl
broad blaclc leather cross-belt, with two very large brass
bucl~les,crosscd his breast. H e had sabre, pistols, and
carbine."
The actual fighting strength of the army of Afghanistan
cannot be definitely stated. Major Lumsden, who has represented the British Government in that country in various
diplomatic capacities, stated (some years since) that the
regular army of the Arneer consisted of sixteen regiments
of infantry, three of cavalry, and seventy-six field guns.
The infantly regiments numbered about 800 Inen each;
the men were obtained by compulsory levy. Their uniform consisted of English cast-off clothes purchased at
auction. T h e pay, about five rupees per mensem, was
paid irregularly and often in kind ; two months' pay was
deducted for clothing. T h e cavalry and artillery were
badly l ~ o r s e d ; and the horses were sent t o graze in
summer. A Russian report of 1868 estimates the infantry
at ~ o , o o omen. The armament, equipment, and instruction of the troops' have doubtless improved since that
time, as ten years later the British Government supplied
the Afghan Government with ~ o , o o oEnfield and 5,000
Snider rifles and one field battery, and very recently
(1555) it was announced that a present of Martini-Henry
rifles and improved field guns had been sent t o Abdurrallman b y the Indian authorities.
~ e s i d e s the regular army there is a paid irregular
mounted force of about 20,000 men, active and forinidab1.e
in hill operations," and lcnown as Jezailcl~is.
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T h e late Gcncral Colin Maclrenzic, in an account of his
expcriences in the Elphinstone disaster of 1842, says :
" T h c Jczailchis are so called from their jezails or long
rifles. T h e Afghans are said t o be among the bcst marksmen in the world. They are accustomed to arms from
early boyhood, live in a chronic state of warfare with
their neighbors, and are most skillul in talring advantage of
covcr. A n Afghan will throw himself flat, behind a stone
barely big enough to covcr his head, and scoop a hollow
in the ground with his left clbow as he loads. Mcn lilre
these only require training to lnalre first-rate irregular
troops.
"As a trait of Afghan character, I must mention that
whenever the Jezailchis could snatch five minutes to
refrcsh tl~emsclveswith a pipe, one of them would twang
a sort of a rude guitar as an accompanime~ltto soine
martial song, which, mingling with the notes of war,
sounded very strangely."
T h e Russian General Staff have also estimated the
Ameer's force, exclusive of t h e irregulars, at 66,400 men
with 30 guns.
T h e efficiency of this body, by reason of their peculiar
surroundings, must vaiy with the character of t h e operations. F o r defence-particularly of their own sectionthey form an important consideration ; for aggressive purposes their strength lies in partisan operations, in small
detachments, requiring great mobility.
Just as it is difficult t o understand the rapidity with
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which large numbers are assembled in Afghanistan for
fighting purposes, so the dispersing of an Afghan army
together with its attendant masses of tribal levies in flight
is almost beyond comprehension; men who have beell
actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat dispose of their
arms in the villages they pass through, and meet their
pursuers with melons or other fruit in their hands, while
they adopt the rble of peaceful inhabitants.
A brief description of some of the more noted cities of
Afghanistan may be appropriate here.
Sir Henry Rawlinson gives the following details respecting the so-called Key of India-the city of Herat:
a That which distinguishes Herat from all other Oriental cities, and at the same time constitutes its main defence, is the stupelldous character of the earthwork upon
which thc city wall is built. This earthwork averages
250 fcet in width at the base and about 5 0 feet in height,
and as it is crowned by a wall 25 feet high and 14 feet
thick at the base, supported by about I50 semicircular
towers, and is further protected by a ditch 45 feet in
width and 16 feet in depth, it presents an appearance of
imposing strength. Whether the place is really as strong
as it loolts has been differerltly estimated. General Ferrier, who resided for some time in Herat, in 1846, states
that the city is nothing more than an immense redoubt,
and gives it as his opinion that, as the line of wall is entirely without flanltiilg defences, the place could not hold
out for twenty days against a European a r m y ; and M.
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Khaniltoff, who, although not a professional soldier, was a
very acute observer, further rcmarlts that the whole in-.
terior of the city is dominated from the rising ground 700
yards distant and covered with solid buildings at the northeast angle, while the water supply both for the ditch and
the city would be at the mercy of an enemy holding the
outside country; the wells and reservoirs inside the wall,
which could then alone be available-being quite inadequate t o the wants of the inhabitants: but on the other
hand, all experience testifies to the defensibility of the
position.
" Not t o speak of the siege which Herat sustained af the
hands OF Genghiz Khan, of Timur, and of Ahmed Shah,
we have only to remember that in 1837 the Afghans of
Herat, under Major Eldred Pottinger, beat off the continuous attacks, for nearly ten months, of a Persian army
of 35,000 regular troops supported by fifty pieces of artillery, and in many cases directed and even commailded b y
Russian officers. T h e truth seems to be that Herat, althougli in its present state quite unfit to resist a European
army, possesses great capabilities of defence, and might
by a skilful adaptation of the resources of modern science
be made almost impregnable. Major Saunders, a British
engineer officcr, calculated in 1840 that, at an outlay of
£60,000, which would iilclude the expenses of deepening
the ditch, clearing the glacis and esplanade, providing
flanking defences, and repairing the walls througl~out,
I-Ierat might be rendered secure against any possible renewal of the attack by Persia."
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The location of this city upon the principal thoroug11fare between India, Persia, and Turkestan gives it a specia1 importance in a military sense. I t is also the
principal mart of Western Afghanistan, and comprises
extensive manufactures in wool and leather. The natural
fertility of the couiltry near Herat has been enhanced
by irrigation.
"The valley, orjzl&nh (as the Persians say), in which the
city lies is rich in the possession of a river. This valley is
about thirty miles long by sixteen in breadth, exclusive
of the ground taken up by the fortress and the walls.
Four, of these miles separate the town from the northern
and twelve from the southern hills, while a t one quarter
of the greater distance runs the Her-i-Rhd or I-Ierat River,
which, rising near the Kuh-i-Baba, pursues a westerly
course till, passing the city, it sweeps, first gradually, then
decidedly, t o the north, eventually t o lose its identity in
the environs of Sarakhs. I t is of political as well as of
geographical importance, for it passes between the Persian and Afghan frontier posts of Kallriz and Khs6n
respectively, and may be considered t o mark the PersoAfghan boundary at the Western Paropismus. The Plain,
south of the walls, is watered by a net-work of eight or
nine large and many minor ditches. T h e aqueducts are
stated t o be superior to those of Bokl~ara,Samarcand, and
Ispallan. The grain produced is abundant-beyond the
requirements of town and suburbs together. T h e bread,
the water, and the vines have the merit of special excel-
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lence. Yet, with all this wealth of means and material,
capable of subsisting an army of 150,ooo men for some
time, much of the legacy of past ages is disregarded and
nullified by the supineness of a present generation. The
ruins visible on all sides are not all useless or obsolete
works. A s one conclusive instance may be cited the
neglected ' PLil-i-Malan.' This bridge, of twenty-three
arches, can scarcely be considered void of purpose or practical benefit. I t is, however, rapidly falling into decay,
and as the river has changed its bed, part of it remains,
barren of object, on dry land. On the rising of thc waters
this state of things is inconvenient ; for the river, a t such
time, is no longer fordable, and the Kandahar caravans,
going to and fro, have difficulty in crossing." *
In 1830 Conolly was of opinion that the city was one
of the dirtiest in the world, being absoIutely destitute of
drainage ; and VAmbery, thirty-three years afterward,
when the city was captured by Dost Mohammed, says
t h e city was largely a heap of rubbish, having suffered
the horrors of a long siege.
The city of Kabul, from which the surrounding territory
of Eastern Afghanistan takes its name, stands in lat. 34"
30' N., and long. 69" 6' E., near the point where the Kabul
River is crossed by three bridges. Its altitude is 6,400
feet, and, within a short distance to the north, is overtopped by pinnacles of the Hindu Kash about 14,ooo feet
higher.
*Sir F. J. Goldsmid,

"

Journeys Between Herat and IChiva."
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The winters arc severe, but the summers are very ternperate-scld~m going above 80'. Icabul is fortified without and within ; being separated into quarters by stone
walls: the Bala Hissar, or citadcl propel; bcing on the
east, while the Persian quarter 01 the city is strongly
protected on the southwest. I n the days of Sultan
Baber, Kabul was the capital of the Mogul empire. In
modern times, it has been the scenc of many AngloIndian struggles. I t was taken by the British in 1839,
and lost by them, through treachciy, in 1841 ; in the
following January, 4,000 British soldiers and 12,000 campfollowers were massacrkd while retreating.
ICandahar, t l ~ ccapital of Central Afghanistan, is about
two hundred miles S. W. of ICabul, and thrce hundred and
seventy-one miles E. of Herat. I t is said t o have been
founded by Alexander of Macedon. T h e city is laid out
at right angles, and is watered from the neighboring rivers
through canals, which send to every street an ample supply. Sir Michael Biddulph describes the surroundings:
" I<andahar stands on the western side of a plain, which
was origiilally a barren slcirt of the mountain. Exactly
opposite t o the city, and two miles t o t h e westward, there
is a wide break in the dividing ridge, through which the
road to I-Ierat leads, and by wliich are conducted the
many canals and watercourses, talcen from the Argandab,
to supply the town and fertilize its environs. T h e energy
and skill displayed in these extensive water-worlts cannot
be too highly extolled. Brought from a point many miles
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distant in the Argaildab valley, t h e chief canal, with its
offsl~oots,conducts a vast body of water, which is dispersed along thc contours of the declining plain i n
innumerable channels, spreading a rich fertility for inany
miles in a fan-like form to the southeast of t h e gap.
Villages clustcr around t h e city on three sides ; ~ 0 ~ 1 1 fields, orchards, gardens, and vineyards are seen in
luxurious succession, presenting a vcritable oasis w i t h i n
t h e girdle of rugged hills and desert wastes all a r o u n d .
A n d if we turn to t h e aspect of the country beyond the
gap, w c see in the Argandab valley, along t h e canals and
t h e river banlts, a fair and beautiful landscape of v i l l a g e
and cultivated ground, stretching for many miles in e a c h
direction. This productive character of the i m m e d i a t e
neighborhood of Kandahar, and its commanding p o s i t i o i ~
within rcach of other fertile districts, would give to this
place, under a strong, stable, and just government, as
mucll prosperity and happiness as falls to t h e lot of a n y
place in the world."
Jelalabad stands on the Kabul River, about half-way bctween Kabul and the IChaiber Pass. I t was the scene of t h e
stubborn defence by Sir Robert Sale in 1842, referred t o
elsewhere. I t has a floating population of about t h r e e
thousand souls. Our engraving is taken from the south and
west. Tlze stream in t h c wcst is t h e Kabul River. T h e J a t i
gate in t5e south wall is the exit from the E-Iindu q u a r t e r .
T h c Kabul exit is on the west, while t h e road to P e s h a w u r
commences a t the gate of that name on the east wall o f
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the city. T h e norther^^ gate is Itno~vnas the Phecl Khana,
or elephant quarter. T h e walls of the town and of its
houses are of mud, and t h e roofs gencrally of wood.
T h e city is laid out in the form of a parallclogram intersected by two main streets crossing in the centre.
T h e town of Ghazni (the ancient Ghizni) is another
historical landmarlr in a region famous for its evidences of
former grandeur. I t stands about 230 miles northeast of
I<andahar on the road t o Kabul ; it is literally " founded
upon a rock " a t a n elevation of 7,726 feet, and its base is
280 feet above the adjacent plain. I t has svalls thirty-five
feet high, and a wet ditch, but is not considered in any
sense formidable by modcrn engineers, as it is commanded
by neighboring heights; it will always be a rendezvous
for the natives, and forms a station or an important line
of com~nunicatiollbetweell the Indus and the Murghab.
I n the tenth century it was the seat of an empire comprising the present territory of Afghanistan, and which
had in the space of sevellty years absorbed thirty-eight
degrees of longitude and twenty degrees of latitude. I t s
decline dates from the twelfth centuly, when the seat of
government was transferred t o Lahore. From 1839 t o
1880 it bas been occupied alternately by the British and
the Afghans. T h e climate is not exceptionally severe,
although in winter the mercury drops to 25" below zero
a t times. T h e population averages about ten thousand.
Peshawur is one of the most important towns, both in
a military and commercial sense, in the Dcrjnt. I t is
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the capital of a province of the same name on the N. \V.
frontier of India, eighteen miles from the Ichaiber Pass a n d
one hundred and fifty miles S. E. of Icabul. I t h a s t h e
usual bastioned dcfenccs, besides some detached works of
more importance. I t was ohce a rich and populous city,
but has, like Inally other like places in that region, fallen
from its high estate. I t is garrisoned by tlle British, and
can boast of fair trade and a populatioii of about fifty
thousand. I t is the centre of a fruitful district containitlg
more than onc inillion inhabitants.
T h e fruitful valley and pass of Bamian lie on the road
leading from Kabul to Turltestan. The pass, a t an elevation
of 8,496 fcet, is the only known defile over the H i n d u
Kash practicable for artillery. This valley was one of t h e
chief centres of Buddhist worship, as gigantic idols, mutilated indeed by fanatical Mussulmans, conclusively prove.
Bamian, with its colossal statues cut out in t h e rock, was
among the wonders described by the Buddhist monks w h o
traversed Central Asia in the fourth century. The statues
are found on a hill about three hundred feet high, in which
are a number of cells excavated in the roclr, not unlike
those found in the Zuni country in the westcrn part of t h e
United States. The male figure is about 160 ieet, t h e female 120fcet, in height ; they are clothed in light drapery,
and a winding stair may be ascended to the head.
Eight miles eastward of Bamian lies the ancient fortress
of Zohak, attributed to t h e fabulous Pel-sian serpent-king of
t h a t name. It is still used as one of the dcfences of t h e pass.
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of Afghanistan adapted to lnilitary transThe
port purposes arc the camel, the ynhzi (mountain pony),
and the donlcey.
From certain professional papers, 011 thc camel, by Cap.
tain Yaldwyn and other oficcrs of the Indian Army, we
learn that this beast of burden has been oftcn utilized by
the British in Afghanistan, and the supply of camels
raised in that country has generally been augmented by
drafts from India, although the last mentioned do not
thrive uncler thc transition. The camel is docile, capable
of abstinence in an emcrgency, well adapted for the im.
position of loads and for traversing over flat or sandy
adapts itself to rough roads, has acute sight and
smell, and, during progression, moves both fcet on one
side, simultaneo~~sly.Its flcsh and milk arc ~v11oIesome
articles of food. I t is deficient in ~nuscularpowerbehind,
and cannot readily climb hills, Those'found in Afghanistan are of the Arabian species. They arc strong, thickset, with abundance of bair ; are short in the leg, better
climbers, and more accustomed t o cold tban others of the
species. Their feeding requires as much care as that of
cavalry or artillery horses; they are fond of green food,
and certain trees and shrubs. In grazing, camels brought
from India sometimes are poisoiled by eating the oleander
bush and other plants which the native camel avoids.
Elphinstone's ill-fated cxpedition in 1841 lost 800 out of
2,500 camels from this cause alone. On the march, or
wl~cregrazing does not abound, thcy are fed with grain

tary transa i n pony),
31, by CapArmy, we
tilized by
o f camels
~ e n t e dby
3d <lo not
c, capable
)r the irnor s a n d y
sight and
et on one
rbolesome
er b e h i n d ,
LI A f g h a n )ng,thicke g , better
lers of the
LS
t h a t of
.een food,
s brought
2 oleander
~1 avoids.
500 o u t of
march, or
6th grain

-

and 6h0osn-~;this is given them in one ration at t h e end of
t h e day. The theory that camcls d o not require niuch
watering is declared a fallacy; tlie Arabian species can
talre in five or six gallons, sufficient for as many days ;
they will not clrinlc cold running water; but, where water
can be had, they s11ouId be watered daily. Tlle load of
the camel varies from 300 t o 450 pounds, depending
upon its conditioii. I t is admirably adapted for carrying
long articles, as ladders, tent-poles, and cvcn light mountain guns. The marching power of camels depends on a
number of conditions. They are good goers in loose
sandy soil, and even over stony ground, if the stones a r e
not too large and sharp ; in slippery places they are useless, as they have no hold with their feet. They are very
enduring, making the longest marches at an avcrage speed
of two miles an hour, and can ford deep rivers with ease
if the current is not too rapid. When the bottom of t h e
ford is shifting sand, the passage of a number of camels
renders i t firm. A string oi 500 camels covers about o n e
mile of road; 1,250 mules, carrying t h e same weight of
supplies, occupy double t h e distance. Camels must be unladen at fcrrics. For military purposes these animals a r e
purchased between the ages of five and nine years, and m a y
b e used u p to the age of sixteen. They average about
one tl~ousandpounds in weight, seven feet in height to
t h e top of the hump, and eight feet in length from nose
t o tail. I n camp and when not at work they are arranged
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in lines facing each other, or in circles heads inward ; the
latter plan is the favorite lormation a t night.
The
allowance of spare camels on service is ten per cent.
Lieut. Martin, R. E., states that his company, of Sappers
and Miners, was ablc to get an exceptional percentage
of labor from the camels under his charge by attention t o
certain details; and says further, that "camels are very
and bite cach other badly when grazing.
They can ford four feet of moderately running water,
easily, if the bed is good ; b u t a yard of greasy mud, a few
inches deep, will throw many camels and delay a convoy
for hours. Camel-bridges were carried on the leading
camels, with a few shovels and picks, in every convoy of
the Kandahar Field Force, and all small cuts or obstructions were thus bridged in a few minutes ; the camels remaining b y their bridges (two gang-boards eight by three
fect) until the last baggage camcl had passed. I n perfectly open country, such as Kandahar to Girishk, it was
found possible to march the camels on a broad front,
the whole convoy being a rough square ; camels starting at 3 A.M. have been lc~lown t o arrive at camp ten
miles off as late as 5 P.M."
Captain Yaldwyn says: " A camel's carrying-power is
equal to that of two and a half mules or ponies, whilst his
ration is only about that of one mule or pony. Thus 500
camels only eat as much as 5 0 0 mules or ponies, and
whilst the latter can only carry 1,000 ~naz~fzds*
the
% ~rtrai6ndis 80 pounds.
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former can carry 2,500. Again, 500 camels only require 125 attendants to be paid, clothcd, and fed, whilst
500 mules or ponics rcquirc 167 attendants." But, on the
other hand, the immense losses of camels from excessive
heat or cold, or over-exertion in mountainous or rough
roads, and other causes, greatly neutralize the force of
this comparison.
The jtnbz? is a hardy mountain pony used by the
Afghans for the saddle and packing purposes; they are

1

i

I

I

very strong, activc, and sure-footed, and have been
frcquently used by the British forces in their military
operations. In 1839 Captain (afterward Gencral) Outram
relates that his ynbz~, " although but thirtecn hands
high, carried me and my saddlebags, weighing altogether
upward of sixteen stone, the whole distance from ICalLt
in seven days and a half (an average of nearly forty-seven
milcs a day), during which time I had passed I I I hours on
its back ; there was no saddle on the pony, merely a cloth
over his back."
They will carry from four to five maunds with perfect
ease, malting journeys of thirty miles a day. Those which
are ridden and which amble, are called yurgns. The
Afghans tie a knot in the middle of the long tails of their
horses, which, they say, strengthens the animal's baclbone !
T h e Afghan donkey was severely tested in 1880 during
the operations of Sir Donald Stewart between Icabul and
Kandahar, and this class of carriage was found very useful
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in the conveyance of provisions. Afghan donkeys
will march with troops and carly loads of grain or flour,
averaging ninety pounds, without difficulty. They lrcep
pace wit11 mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they
avoid the frequent checks ~vhichretard the larger animals ;
they browse on the line of march, and find their own forage easily in the neighborhood of camp ; they are easily
controlled and cared for, and are on all accounts the most
inexpensive transport in Eastern countries.+
T h e transport animals found in India and Turlrestan
will be described in the parts of this boolr devoted t o the
military resources of those regions.
In concluding this sketch of the "Threshold of India,"
a mere glance at; the military history of the country will
suffice. In fact, only so far as it may have a bearing upon
the present, has reference to the past any place in this
volume.
T h e early periods o i eventful interest to Afghanistan
have been already noted a t the opening of this chapter.
Its purely Oriental experiences were beginning to fade
with the death of Nadir Shah-variously
termed the
"Butcher of Delhi," and the "\Vallace of I'ersia," in I 747.
His progress toward India, from which h e was to tear its
choicest treasure and loot its greatest city, reminds one of
the Arabian Nights. A camp-follower from Jclalabad reported as follows: " He has 36,000 horsemen with himAfter morning prayers h e sits on a throne,
self ** *

-"

'k

Lieut.-Col. E. F. Chapman, C.B.,R.A.
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the canopy of which is in the form of a dome and of gold.
One thousand young men, with royal standards of red
sill<and the lance tops and tassels of silver, are disposed
regularly ; and, at a proper distaqce, live hundred beautiful
slaves, from twelve t o twenty years old, stand-one half on
his right and the other on his left. All the great mcll
stand fronting him; and the Arzbkgi stands between, in
readiness to represent whatcver he is desired, and everybody has his cause decided a t once : bribery is not so
m'uch as known hcre. I-Ic has particular information
given him of every thing that passes ; all criminals, great
and small, rich and poor, meet with immediate death. He
sits till noon, after which he dines, then reposcs a little ;
when afternoon prayers are over he sits till the cvening
prayers, and when they are over he shoots fivc arrows into
the Khnk Tzjdah, and then goes into thc women's apartments." *
T h e splendor of the Robber Icing has departed, but his
deeds of blood and treachery have often been repeated in
the country of the Afghans.
A succession of struggles between Afghan and Pel-sian
leaders for the controlof Afghanistan marked the next fifty
years.
Whcn the project of Russian invasion of India, suggested by Napoleon, was under consideration in Pcrsia,
a British envoy was sent, in 1809,to the then Shah Sujah,
and received the most cordial reception a t Pcahawur.
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13ut Shah Sujah was, in 1810, superseded by his brother,
Mahmucl, and the latter was pressed hard by the son of
his Wazir to such an extent that I3erat alone remained
to him. In 1823 his former kingdom passed t o Dost
Mohammed, who in 1826 governed Kabul, I<andal~ar,
Ghazni, and Peshawur. T h e last-named place fell into
the hands of Runjeet Singh, the " Lion of the Punjab."
Dost Mohammed then applied to England for aid in
recovering Peshawur, failing in which he threatened to
turn to Russia.
That Power was (1837) engaged in fomenting trouble in
the western part of Afghanistan, encouraging a n attack
by 30,000 Persians, led by Russian officers, upon I-Ierat.
Instead of acceding t o the request of Dost Mohammed,
the British Governor-General-Lord Auclcland-declared
war against that potentate, alleging in a proclamation
that " t h e welfare of the English possessions in the East
rendcrcd it necessary to have an ally on their western
frontier who would be in favor of peace, and opposed t o
all disorders and innovations."
This was the beginning of intrigues relating to Afghanistan on the part, alternately, of England and Russia, in
which John Bull has had t o pay, literally, " t h e lion's
share" of thc cost: in blood and treasure. In 1850, Sir
John Cam I-Iobhouse, President of the Board of Control
in India confessed : "The Afghan war was done l?y~ ~ z y s s l f ;
the Court of Directors had nothing to do with,it." T h e
reason already mentionid was alleged as an excuse for
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hostilities. They were declarcd, notwithstanding that the
British political agent a t t h c Court of Dost Mohammed
reported that ruler as "entirely English" in his sympathies. This report was suppressed. Twenty years latcr the
factswere given to Parliament, Russian letters were found
implicating the Czar's ministers, and the English agent,
Burnes, was vindicated.
The Anglo-Indian army-consisting of twenty thousand
troops, fifty thousand followers, and sixty thousand
camels-advanced in two columns, one from Bengal, and
the other from Bombay by the Indus. Scindc, which
had hitherto been independent, lilcc the Punjab and
Lahore, was subjugated e7c route, and nine thousand mcn
were left behind t o occupy it. On the 23d of February,
1839, a simultaneous advance from Shiltarpur, on the
Bolan Pass, commcnced. Icandahar was occupied April
25t11, Ghazni July z3d, and Kabul August 6th, and Shah
Sujah was proclaimed Ameer by British authority. By
the following September the greater part of t h e English
forces returned to India. Only five regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry remained in Afghanistan, where suspicious symptoms of discontent with the new order of
things began very soon to show themselves. During the
summer of 1840 insurrections had to be put down by
force in several places. I n November of the same ycar
Dost Mohammed defeated the English in the Pcrwan
Pass. From that time until the autumn of 1841 a sultry
calm reigned in the country.

T h e English commanders, although fully aware of the
state of mind of the people, neglected to take the most
simple measures of precaution.
T h e local control was vested in a mixed military and
civil council, consistiilg of General Elphinstone, uilfittcd
by disease and natural irresolutioll from exercising the
functions of command, and Sir William McNaghten, the
British envoy, whose self-confidence and trust in the
treacherous natives made him an easy victim. I n the
centre of an insurrection which was extending day by day
under their eyes and under their own roofs, these representatives of a powerful nation, with a small but effective
force, deliberately buried their hcads in the sand of their
credulity, not realizing the nature of t h e danger which for
wecks was evident t o many of their subordinates.
Finally a force of the insurgents, under the direction of
the son of the deposed ruler, Altbar Khan, threw off the disguise thcy had assumed before the English, and taking possession of the Ichurd I<abul Pass near t h c city, entirely cut
off the retreat t o India which Elphinstone had commenced.
A s there was no intelligent coilcert of action among the
British leaders, the garrison melted away in detail, the
Afghan auxiliaries refused t o fight, o r turned their arms
against the Europeans. Sir William McNaght en was
murdered' by Altbar, a t a coui~cilin sight of t h e garrison.
A few attempts t o force a passage, or to defend themselves, made b y certain brave officers of the beleagured
force, failed.
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On January 6, 1842, an agreement was made by which
the Afghan leader promised to ensure to the British forces
a safe withdrawal to India. This was violated with
Afgllatl readiness, and the entire Anglo-Indian contingent
of sevcntcen thousand souls was destroyed; sacrificed
to the murderous brutality of the Afghan insurgents,
or dying from exposurc t o one of the most severe winters
lc~lown to that region. Months after, heaps of dead
bodies, preserved by the intense cold, obstructed the
mountain passes. The horrors of Moscow wcre rcpcated
in the IChurd ICabul, and the noblest attributes of 11~manity were exemplified in the acts of the officers and
soldiers of the doomed party. Only twenty of this entire
force survived. The news of this horrible disaster was
brought to Jelalabad by the only mail who penetrated
the Afghan environment, Dr. Brydon.
On receipt of the news of this overwhelming catastrophe, the Indian Government endeavored to rescue the
garrisons of ICandahar and Ghazni, as well as that of
Jelalabad; but the Mohammedan troops refused to
march against their co-religionists, and the Sikhs also
showed great unwillingness. T h e garrison of Ghazni,
thinking to secure its safety b y capitulation, was cut
to pieces December 23, 1841. Jelalabad, held by 2,400
men under General Sale, still withstood the storm lilce a
rock of iron. General Nott, the energetic officer commanding at Kandahar, on receiving the news of the destruction of the British, blew up the ,citadel of the town,
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destroyed eveiy thing not necessary to, his object, and
started, August 8, 1842, for Ghazni, which he also destroyed, Septcmber Gth.
Another British force of twelve thousand men, under
General Polloclt, was organized at Peshawur, t o punish the
Afgl~ans,and, so far as might be, retrieve thc errors of
Elphinstone and McNaghten. Pollock's operations were,
in the sense of retaliation, successf~~l.An eminent German authority wrote : " ICabul and other towns were
from guns, and the people were collected together and de- .
stroyed lilte worms." General Polloclc carried the famous
Khaiber Pass, in advancing to the relief of Jelalabad in
April, 1842. This was the first time that the great defile
-twenty-eight miles in length-had
ever been forced by
arms. Timur Lang and Nadir Shah, a t the head of their
enormous hosts, bought a safe passage through it from
the Afridis. Akbar the Great, in 1587, is said to have lost
forty thousand men in attempting to force it, and Aurangzeb failed to get through.
The misfortune of Elphinstone's command, great as it
was, would have been much more humiliating to England,
had it not becn for the firmness of the gallant General
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or any Administration, and, a t great personal risk, gained
his point.
111 the forced march to Icabul, which Pollock made subsecluently, the force of about eight thousand men moved in
as light order as possible. Aftcr loading the com~nissariat
camels to their utmost carrying capacity, the General discovered that the mounted men had in their ltit a spare
pair of pai~taloonsapiece, 011 which. he ordered the legs
to be fillcd with graill and carried by the men in front of
them, on their saddles. By t h e middle of December t h e
British had started on their return march, pursued as far
as the Indus by the Afghans, and by this hurried conclusion to the war lcssened their prestige in Asia t o an
enormous degree.
As Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote:
' l I t was not so much the fact of our &treat ; disaster
would have been diminished, if not altogether overcome ;
but retreating as we did, pursued even through thc last
pass into the plains by an implacablc enemy, the impression became universal in India as well as in Central Asia,
that we had simply been driven back across the inountains."
A very able I-Iindu gentleman, very loyal to the British,
traced the mutiny of 1857 in a great measure to the Afghan campaign of I 842. H e said: " I t was a direct breach
of faith to take tlze Sepoys out of India. Practically they
were compelled to go for fear of being treated as mutineers, but the double pay they received by no means

'
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compensated them for losing caste. Thc Sepoys mis.
trusted thc Government from that timc forward, alld
were always fearing that thcir caste would bc dcstroycd;
besides, the Kabul disaster taught them that Europeans
were not invincible."
T h e departure of the English forces was followccl by
tile i-e~stablish~ncnt
of Dost Mohammed's authority in
Afghanistan. Once, at the time of the Silt11 insurrection,
the Dost cl*ossed the Indian border with two thousand
l~orsemen,and narrowly escaped falling into thc hands of
the British in the affair of Gujrat, February 21, r 849,
where the specd of his horse alone saved him irom capture.
In 185s a better unclcrstailding was clfectcd between the
son of Dost Mohammed and his powcrful Eu~opcan
neighbor. He rcconquercd Balk11 in 1850, and gained
Icandahar by inheritance in I 855, while he lost Herat to
the Persians in 1856. With the aid of Grcat Britain, in
1857, Persia rclinquished a11 claims t o Herat, but thc Dost
had cvcntually t o besiege that city, occupicd by a rcbcllious faction, in 1863, and after a siege of tcll months reduced the place, only to find a tomb within its walls.
After the usual struggle for the thl-one, pcculiar to a
change of dynasty in Afghanistan, S l ~ c r cAli, one of the
Dost's sons, prevailed, and was recognized i n 1S68. The
ncxt dccade was notable for a serics of diplomatic mnnceuvrcs betwccn Englaiid and Russia. for Afghan friendship.
Shere Ali now lcallcd toward thc Lion, now in tlle dircction of the Bear, with t h e regularity of a pendulu~n. The
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advances were received with presents and promises on t h e
one hand, and promises, powerful embassies, and imposing
military expeditions on the other. O n September 21,
1875, a British ambassador was turned back by the Afghan
com~nandantof the frontier fort of Ali Musjid, and on
the 20th of November, of t h e same year, war was declarcd
against Shere Ali b y the Anglo-Indian Govcrnmcnt. A t
that time thc Russian General Icaufmnnn was operating
on the northern border of Afghanistan with a forcc of
fifteen thousand men and sixty guns, and the Amecr had
reason t o thinL that he could rely 011 Russian cooperation
against the English, who, with a forcc of forty thousand
mcn, promptly invaded his dominion.
This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns,
under t h e command, rcspectivcly, of Generals Urowne,
Roberts, Biddulph, and Stewart, with reserves under Gcnerals Maude and Primrose.
W e shall have occasion later t o consider some of the
details of the protractcd operations which followed,
They e~nbraccd several admirably conducted marches,
exposure t o excessively severe winter weather, t h e succcssful surmounting of great natural obstaclcs, t h e developmcnt of the usual weakness in t h e dcpartrneit of
transport, with unnecessary losses in animals, a considerable sicklist, and an inconsidcrablc proportion of killed
and wounded in action.
The military benefits were those resulting from a long
and arduous field expcricncc in a rough country.

The

54

A FGJIANIS TAN.

interruption to these actual " field manceuvres," this " firedrill," by the enemy, was comparatively feeble,-as a rule,
stimulating the Anglo-Indian force t o put its best foot
foremost. Under this system, at the end of the two
years' campaign, all departments of the army 11a.d become
moulded into the efficient machines essential to success in
any military venture.
Politically, the campaign had been a failure. T h e fate
of the gallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, murdered at Kabul, Septeinber 3, 1879, made a deeper iinpression on the Afghan mind than the British occupation
of Afghan cities or the Afghan losses in battle.
In the same year the British Secretary for India, in
London, wrote to the Governor-General that : " I t appears
that as the result of two successful campaigns, of the
employment of an immense force, ancl of thc expenditure
of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it
was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the
assuinption of fresh and unwelconle liabilities in regard
to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy
throughout tlle remainder of the country."
Early in the year 1880, t h e British Government prepared to make a dignified withdrawal from Afghanistan.
That volcanic region was by no means tranquil, although
t h e chief rebel, Yakoub IChan, had becn driven out of
Kabul by General Roberts, and had retircd t o t h e distant
country of the Heri-i-rad. A t this time appearcd t h e
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exiled Abdurraliman Khan, who had long resided at
Tash]tend, and who was welcomcd warmly by the local
sirdars on the northern frontier of Afghanistan. As hc
Kabul his authority and influence increased,
and the British political officers, acting under instructions,
formally recog~lized him as Amccr of that district, In
the meanwhiIe Yalcoub advanced wcstward from I-Terat
with a strong force, encountered a British brigade, under
General Burrows, near the Helmund, and utterly routcd
it. The rem~lailtof t h e European force took refuge in
I<andahar, wherc General Primrose was in command.
Surrounding the city, Yalcoub succeeded in effectually
"bottling up" the British garrison for some time. Sir
Fredcriclc Robcrts, however, made a rapid march from
Kabul on I<andahai-, a n d after a successful and decisive
battlc with the Afghans, completely dispcrsed t h e native
force, and relieved thc beleaguered garrison. Soon aftcr,
Abdurrahman was formally installed as A ~ n e e of
r Afghaniand
the
British
army
withdrew
froin
the
country.
stan,

T E E BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES.

A

of the military resources of Great Britain,
more especially thosc available for ficld service in Afghanistan, with notes upon the strength and composition of
t h e forces, meails of transport and supply, nature of i m portant lines of coininunication, and of certain strategic
points in the probable theatre of operations, will be
attempted in this chaptcr.
O~gaalzizntio7z.-Thc military system of Great Britain is
based ulsoil voluntary enlistment instead of the usual
European plan of uilivcrsal liability t o servicc. Recruits
m a y enlist eithcr for t h e " short-servicc " or " long-service"
term ; the first bcing for six years in the ranks and six on
furlough, and tlic last for twclvc years in thc ranks; the
furlough of short-service mcn is passcd in the a r m y
rcscrve, and then, in consideration of liability t o bc rccallcd
t o the colors, the inen are paid sixpence a day.
T h e troops of the Standing Army, (Unitcd Icingdom,)
March, 1885, were proportionately distributed as follo\vs :
forty-three per cent. in England, two per ccnt. in S c o t lancl, twenty-five per cent. in Ircland, and thirty-iivc per
cent. abroad, not including India.
F o r purposes of administration, instruction, and mobiliSICETCH
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zation, Great Britain and Ireland are partitioned into
tllirtecn military districts commanded by gcnernl officers.
These arc sub-dividcd as follows : for thc infantry onc
hundred and two sub-districts undcr regimental commanders ; for the artillery there arc twelve sub-districts,
and for the cavalry two districts. The brigade of an infalltry sub-district con~prisesusually two line battalions,
two militia battalions, the brigade dep8t, rifle volunteer
corps, and infantry of the army reserve. Of the line battalions onc is gellcrally at home and one abroad. I n an
artillcry sub-district are comprised a proportion of the
royal artillery ancl artillery of the militia, volunteers, and
army reserve respcctively. I n likc manncr a cavalry
sub-district illcludes thc yeomanry and army rcserve
cavalry.
T h e officers on duty in the Adjutant-General's and
Qunrtermastcr's departments of tbe British army are, as a
rule, detailed for a term of five years from the Linc, but
must rcjoin their regin~cntsimmccliately upon ordcrs for
foreign service.
T h e Royal Engineers then were and are organized
into forty-three companies.
T h e cavalry is divided into the Ilousehold Cavalry and
Cavalry of the Line. Tile first named comprises the 1st
and zd Life Guards and Royal Horse 'Guards,-three
regiments. The Line is composed of twenty-eight regiments, as follows : seven of dragoon guards, three
of dragoons, thirteen of hussars, five of lancers. The

,
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strength of regiments varies from 450 to 625 men with
from 300 to 400 troop horses each.
T h e artillery-under the title of the Royal Regiment of
Artillery-is divided into three classes ; the Royal Horse
Artillery of two brigades of twelve batteries each, 1naking
a brigade total of sixty guns ; t h e Field Artillery of four
brigades of seventy-six batteries, and the Garrison Artillcry
of eleven brigades. For the non-professional reader it may
be well to say that, in the horse artillery, all tl~epe?=ronnelof
a battery is mounted, the better t o act with cavalry or
mounted infantry ; under the general term "field artillery"
may be classed mountain batteries (only maintained in
India), field 'batteries proper, in which the guns are
somewhat heavier, arid served by gunners who are not
mounted, but on occasion are carried on the limbers
and on seats attached to the axlcs, and in an einergcncy
may be carried on the " off" horses of teams. Undcr the
class "field artillery," also, would come such large guns as
are required in war for siege or other hcavy opcrations,
and which in India or Afghanistan would be drawn by
bullocl<s.
T h e ii~lantryis composed of thc Guards, tlle Line, and
the Rifles. The Guards consist of thrcc regirncntsGrenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, and Scots Fusilier
Guards; in all scven battalions. T h e Line comprises
102 regiments (204 battalion^); the Rifles four battalio~ls.
Bcsides these there are two regiments of Colonial (West
India) colored troops,

I
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T h e Militia is intended for local dcfcnce, b u t can be
ordered a~lywherewithin the United I<ingdom, and is
available for garrisoil d u t y in the Mediterranean. Enlistment in t h e militia is for six years. The officers are
commissioned b y the Queen, and, as before noted, all t h e
details of control and recruitment are entrusted t o district
commanders. F o r instruction this force may be called
out, for a pcriod not t o exceed eight weelts annuallj-, with
regular officers as instructors. There are 2 12 battalions of
infantry, 25 brigades of garrison artillery, and 3 regiments of engineers comprised in this force.
T h e Militia Reserve, limited to one fourth of the active
militia, is liable t o army service in case of an einergei~cy,
and for t h e tcrm o f six years is entitled to £1 pcr annum.
T h e Volunteers represent '' the bulwark " in case of invasion ; they are orgailized principally as garrison artilleiy
and infantry. The officers are coin~l~issio~lcd
by tbe
county lieutellants, subject t o the approval of t11e Queen.
T h e mcn arc recruited, armed, and instructed b y tlle Government. Recruits a r e required t o attend thirty drills,
and afterward not less than nine clrills annually. T h e
voluilteer lorce is co~nposedof 278 battalio~lsof infantiy,
46 brigades .of garrison artillery and 1 5 battalions of
engineers.
T h e Yeomanry C a v a l ~ yare equipped as light cavalry,
drilI eight days per year, and are subject to call in case of
riot and insurrection, when each mail xvith a horse receives
seven pence a day. There are thirty-eigl~tregiments.

The Ariny of India differs from that of the United
Kingdom, not only in its composition, but in the cl~ai-actcr of its organization. This organizatioil clatcs from
1858, ~ v l ~ cthe
n govcrnrnent passed from the East India
Company t o the Crown.
The European regiments serving in India arc in all respects organized and maintained, as in England. In
each prcsideilcy forming the thrce political subdivisions,
and among xvl~ichthe Anglo-Indian army is distributed,
exists a staff corps which supplies all European officers
permitted to serve with native troops. T11ese officers
must pass certain examinations before they can be assigned to any of the following vacancies in any native
regiment.
INDIAN REGIMENT.
EUROPEANS

Commandnnt,
r Second-in-co~urnnnd
and wing oiiicer,
I Wing-offifiue~.,
2 Wing-subalterns,
r AcIjata11t,
I Qt~arlermnster,
I Medical officer.
I

I

NA'rIVES.

z Sabadars (captains), 1st class,
2

"

4

"

"
'

zd "

3d

"

4 Jemandars (lieats.), 1st "
4
"
"
2cl"
I Ilavildar (serfit.-major),
40 I-Inviltlal-s (st.1-geants),
4 0 Naiclts (corporals),
16 Drummers,
600 Sepoys (privates).

T h e duties of the commandant of a native regiment
correspond in general to those of a similar officer in a
European corps. Three times a weck he holds a " clurbar," for the trial of offeilders and transaction of general
regimental business. T h e mcn are paid b y the native
officers in presence of the European " Wing-officer," who

TIIB BRITISH FORCES A N D ROUTES.
C

United

I C cllnrac.

L ~ C Slrom

ast Illdia

'

in all ro
l
and. Ill j
rlivisions,
jt~ibutcd,
fl oficcrs
officer$
ul be as
ly native
2

63

is rcspoilsible for 'all public property issued to his half
battalion, or wing.
T h e native officers are commissioned by the Indiall
Government, and, gs a rule, arc promoted fl-o~nt11c ranks,
2nd are of the sallle caste as thc privatcs. Ccrtain native
officers of the engineers and artillery may be eligible t o appoiiltment in the correspondi~lgEuropean corps; one is
always assigned as an aide-de-camp to the Viccroy. When
on detailed service, a native officer is allowed to command
his company, but "no battalion parades sboulcl talte place
without tlle presence of a British officer." $. In each regiment there is a drill-sergeant and drill-corporal, who receive extra pay for their services. Corporals are promoted
from privatcs who kilow how to read and write in a t least
one cl~aracter,or \vho have displayed extraordinary courage. T h e pay per month of a scpoy is equal to $3.50 ;
havildar, $7; jemandar, $17.50 ; subadas, $33.50 t o $50.
European officers wit11 native regiments : commandant,
$620; wing-officers, $302 t o $32"
adjutant, $237.86;
quartermaster, $ I 87.86 ; medical officers, $300, ~nonthly.
The annual pay-roll of a native regiment of 720 combatants and 45 non-combatants alnounts to about $69,114.
In consideration of the pay each sepoy is required t o
provide his rations and clotl~ing,except one coat a i d one
pair of trousers issued by tlie. Governmeilt every two
years ; in consequence, each rcgiment is accompanied by
a native village callcd a bazaar, containing tradesmen of
-

-

*Indian Army Regulations.
I

all kinds ; this bazaar is under strict cliscipline and is managed by the quartermaster. The entire outfit follows the
regiment into thc field.
Colonel Gordon of the Indian army testifies : " With
regard to native troops under a cannonade I may say that
I saw our native infantry twice undcr the fire of the
Afghan mountain guns, and thcy behavcd veiy s t c a d i l ~
and coolly. Ammunition was economically expended. I
attributed much the small loss sustaincd by the troops in
Afghanistan to our excellent straight shooting."
The cavalry of India has in certain instances borne an
excellent?rcputation for efficiency in action, is well set up,
and in its instruction and discipline is modelled after the
British systcm. T h e artillery comprises well-instructed
native organizations, but its principal experience has been
with light field guns against irregular troops. T h e Achilles
heel of the Indian army consists in this, that there are but
eight European officcrs to each regiment, and of these but
six would be available t o lcad in battle : t h e quartermaster and surgeon being at such a time otherwise engaged. Thc native officers, seldom having an opportunity
to command in Peace, would be unreliable leaders in such
an cmergency. A t the action of Ali Musjid, November 21,
1878, the day before the occupation of that fort, six
British officers of a native battalion were placcd hors de
co7?zbnt, so that on the first day after crossing t h c Afghan
fronticr there was but one European officer to manage the
regiment.
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Besides the regular establishment there arc about
10,000 European volunteers (inclucling 4,000 railway
officials ailcl employCs) available for local defence.
The feudatoiy chiefs of India enjoy an aggregate
I.Cveilue of some ~ 1 ~ , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0equal
,
t o more than one
third of the illcome of the British Government of 111clia.
They inaintaiil forces aggregating 350,000 mcil with 4,000
guns to perform thc duties of court ceremonial, garrison,
~nilitarjrpolice, guards, and escorts, throughout territorics
aggrcgatiilg nearly 600,000 square miles with 50,000,000
of inhabitants. Thcse forces are unreservedly held at the
disposal of the Crown by the native Princes.
Trn~lsportand Sz$f@.-This
esseiltial featurc of all
wars will be briefly coilsidered in the light of the AngloAfghan War of 1879-80. Large quantities of supplics
were transported froin the maill base of operations on thc
Indus, and distributed to the ti-oops in the field over four
or five distinct liiles of communication, and over roads
a i d moulltaill paths of va~iecl degrees of ruggedness.
Thc country on both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier
was severely taxed to furnish the necessary animals.
Part of the transport was hired-and as in the case of
the Urahuis camels-with thc services of the owners,
\vIlo were easily offended and Iiltely to-decamp with their
property in a night. During the first year the system was
under the direct control of the commissariat department; but as this proved unsatisfactory, in the subsequellt
campaign it was elltirely reorganized and superintcndccl by
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a n officer of engineers, with a large number of officers
from t h e Line t o assist. This gave better satisfaction.
Immense numbers of camels died from heat,* overworlr,
irregular food, and neglect. Owing to t h e dryness of t h e
climate and intense heat of the summer the bullocli-carts
were perpetually falling t o pieces. T h e mules, donkeys,
and ponies gave the best results, but d o not a b o u n d in
sufficient quantities t o enable an army in Afghanistan
t o dispense with camels. A s~iccessful experiment in
rafting, from Jelalabad to Dalrka, was tried. Tlle r a f t s
consisted of inflated skins lashed together with a l i g h t
framework; between June 4-13, seven tllousand s k i n s
were used, and, in all, 885 soldiers a n d one t h o u s a n d
tons of stores were transported forty miles down t h e
Kabul River, the journey talringfive hours. A great d e a l
o f road-malring and repairing was done under tlle supervision of the transport corps. A system of " s t a g e s "
or relays of pack-animals or carts was organized, by
which a regular quantity of supplies was forwarded o v e r
tlle main lines, daily, with almost the regularity, if n o t
the speed, of rail carriage. T h e great number of a n i m a l s
employed required a correspoilding force of a t t e n d a n t s ,
inspectors, and native doctors, all of whom served to
make up that excessive army of " followers " for w h i c h
Anglo-Indian expeditions are famous. Drivers w e r e
*Of a train of eighteen huadred nnloncled camels on the road froril
Dadur to Jacobabad, for six days in June, six hundred clicd of exl~austion.
I n March, 1855 Col. Green, C.B., lost one hundred 311d seventeen h o r s e s out
of four hundred, from the heat, during a march of thirty miles.
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required a t the following ratc : one clriver for each pair
of bullocl<s, every four camcls, cvery three mules and
ponies, every six donlreys. *s
The great obstacle t o the satisfactory operation of the
transport system was its ilovelty and cxperiinental character, and that its organization had t o be combined with its
execution. Besides which, cholera broke out in June and
swept away three hundred cmployPs. Grazing camps
were established in the ncigl~borl~ood
of t h e Bolan Pass
for the bulloclcs, and aqueducts built for the coilveyance
of a water supply; one of thcsc was of masonry, more
than a mile in lcngth, from Dozan dowil to thc Bolan.
I t has been statcd that grazing was scarce in thc region of
the Bolan : in 1879 more than four thousand bulloclcs
were grazed there during the suinmcr, and large quantities
I
of foragc were cut for winter use.
Any prolonged military operations in Afghanistan
must, to a ccrtain extent, utilize hired transport, although
there are many objections urged.
Sir Richard Tcinplc said (1879) : " That the amount of
transport required for active service, such as the late campaign in Afghanistan, is so grcat that to hirc transport is
synonymous t o pressing it froill the pcoplc of tllc district
from which it is hired, and impressment of the ineans of
transport must lead t o impressincnt of drivers, who
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650 ; caazels, 400 ; arztles, 200 ; $o~~ies,
175 ; nzefz, 50.
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naturally (having no interest whatevcr in the campaign in
rvhich they arc called ~ ~ p ot on serve) rcndcr the most unwillillg service and take the carliest opportunity of rendering their animals uilserviceable in hopes of escaping a
clistasteful duty. This scrvice is frequently so uilpopular
that, sooner than lcave t h c boundaries of thcir native
country, the impressed drivers desert, leaving their animals in t h e hands of thc transport authorities or take
them away wit11 them. * 'x. * For thc above reasons
I should recominend t h a t all transport for a campaign
should be the property of Government."
In commenting on this subject, Lord Wolseley relates
that when scrving in China wit11 Indian troops h e "awolce
one morning and found that all our drivers hacl bolted.
Our transport collsisted of carts suppliecl by the Chinese
Government, by contractors, and by the country generally.
I do not think that the carts had bccn carried away, but
all the rnules and men had disappeared except thrcc
drivers wllo beroilged t o me. I was very much astonished
that thcsc lnen had not bolted also. I had a small detachment of cavalry with me and a very excellent dufladar
in charge of it. I aslced hiin how h e had managed to
keep these drivers-having somc timc before said that
unless he loolred after tbein wcll he woulcl never get to
Pekin. I l c replied, with some hesitation : ' I remcmber
what you told me, and t h c fact is I tied t h e tails of those
thrce inen together, overnight, and then tied them t o the
tent pole, ancl put a man ovcr them."'

T h e Elephant, like the stage coach, finds his field of
usefulness, as a meails of transport, growing smaller by
degrees. H e is still a feature in Inclia, and has becn used
for military purposes t o some extent ill thc eastern part of
Afghanistan. H e will dbubtless form part of t h c means
of transportation employcd by the British forces near
their present base, and in rear of thc Kabul-I<anclahar
line, and for that reason is ~loticcdl~erc.+;
The Superintendent of the Governincilt Elcpllailt I<heddabs at Daltka has givcn us, in a rcccilt papcr, much information concerning the elephant in frccdom and captivity.
H e does not claim a 11ig11 ordcl- of ii~tclligci~ce,
but rathcr
of extraordinary obedience and docility for this animal.
Vely large elephants arc exceptional. Twice round the
forcfoot gives the height a t t h c shouldcr ; few femalcs attain the height of eight fcet ; " tuslters," or inalc clephants, vary from eight to nine feet; the Maharajah of
Nahur, Sirmoor, possesses one standing tcn fcct fivc and
one half inchcs. The age varics from 80 t o 1 5 0 years, according t o the bcst authorities, and it is recorded that
those familiar with the haunts of thc wild elephant havc
never found the bones of an elephant that had dicd a
natural death. I n freedom thcy roam in herds of t h i ~ t y
t o fifty, always led by a female; inaturc about twenty-

*

The use of clcpl~antsin transporting ficlcl gtuls in Aighanistn~~
is cmphatically disco~~ragcd
by those who served wit11 it last; very icw flanltcrs were
employed to protecl thc Elephant artillcry usctl in the Karam vnllcy, n~ltlits
success can oi~lybe interpreted by snpposing Ll~cclircct interposi~ionof lJroviclencc or the grossest stupidity to ollr iecl~lccuemy.
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five. In India the males only have tuslts ; in Ceylon only
the females. They are fond of the water, swim well,%but
call neither trot nor gallop ; their only pace is a wallr,
which inay be increascd t o a s/l//$e of fifteen inilcs an hour
for a very short distance ; they cannot leap, and a ditch
eight by eight feet would be impassable.
I n Bcngal and Southern India elephants particularly
abound, and seem t o be increasing in ilumbers. I n the
Billigurungan Hills, a range of three hundred square miles
on the borders of Mysore, they rnadc tllcir appearance
about cighty years ago ; yet prior to that time this region
was undcr high cultivation, traces of orcharcls, orange
groves, and iron-smelting furnaces remaining ill what is
now a l-~owlingwildcrilcss. Elephants are caught in stockades or kraals. The Governmcnt employs l ~ u n t i n gparties
of 350 natives trained to the work, and Illore than IOO
animals are sometimes secured in a singlc drive.
New elephants arc trained by first rubbing thcm down
with bamboo rods, and shouting at thcm, and by tying
them with I-opes; thcy are taught t o kneel by taking
them into streams about five feet decp, when the sun is
hot, and prodding thcm on thc back with sharp sticks.
The total number of elephants rnaiiltaillecl is eight hundred, of which one half are used for military purposes.
Thcy consume about 400 pounds of green, or 250 pouilds
of dry foddcr daily, and are also given unhuskecl rice.
*Elephants have been known to swim a river three hundred yards wide
with the liind legs tied together.
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An elephallt is expccted to carry about 1,200 pounds with
ease. In the Abyssinian Expedition elephants travelled
many hundreds of miles, carrying from 1,500 to 1,800
pou~lds(including their gear), but out of forty-four, five
died from exhaustion ; they are capable of worlcing from'
morning to night, or of remaining under their loads for
twenty hours at a stretch."
An elephant's gear consists of agacEdeZ0, or quilted cloth,
I& inches thick, reachiilg half-way dowil his sides and from
or
the neck to thc croup. 011 this is placed thc g?~d~kl,
pad, 6 x 5 feet ailci g inches thick, formed of stout saclring
stuffed with dried grass. The whole is girthed with a long
rope passed twice around thc body, rouild the neclc as a
breast-strap, and undcr t h e tail as a cruppcr. The ~vhole
weighs 200 pounds. A n improvement upoil this has been
made by our nuthority(Mr. Sanderson), ~ v l ~ i secrns
ch
Lo bear
the same relation t o t h e old gear that t h c open McClellarl
saddle does to thc ordinary British huntiag saddlc. I t
consists (sce illustration) of two pads entircly detached,
each 4 feet long, 1 5 inches wide, and 6 inches thick, made
of blankct covcrccl with tarpaulin, aiicl encased in stout
sacliing. One is placed on each sidc of the elephant's
spine, and rctaiiled there by two iron archcs. There
is no sacldlc-cl'oth, the load rests on the ribs ; the breast-
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There is no "elephant gun-dtill" laid dow11 in the In~peri,tlRegllations,
but when the gnn gocs illlo action the elephant is made Lo l;~iccl, aiid long
'' sltids " m e placed against the crilclle upon wllicll the p n rests, so as to fo1111
an i~lcli~lccl
plane to the ground. The gun is then lifter1 off Llle cradle and
down the skids by levers and Lnclcle.
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strap and crupper hoolr into rings on the saddlc ; there
are rings to fasten the load to ; it weighs 140 pounds.
With foot-boards it is convenient for riding; a cradle call
also bc attached for carrying field guns. Reccnt experiments have shown thc pi-acticabili~yof conveying clep l ~ a l ~ tby
s rail in ordinary open cattlc-trucks; they were
indifferent to the motion, noiscs, or bridgcs ; it is said that
32 elephants could bc thus carried on onc train.
Thc excellc~ltrailway facilities for moving troops and
supplies to the Indo-Afghan frontier wcre described in
1880, by Traffic Manager Ross, of the Scindc, Punjnb, and
Delhi Railway, bcfore the Unitcd Scrvicc Iilstitutio~lof
India.
I-Ie stated that experiments had been made by the ~nilitary and railway authorities in loading and disembarking
troops and war nzntc'rirl, and that much experience had
been afforded by the Afghan operatioils of 1878-9.
Tbe moveinent of troops to and from the frontier commenced in October, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During
that period were conveyed over his road ~go,ooomen,
33,000 animals, 500 guns, I 12,000,000 pounds of militaiy
stores. The rnaxi~numnuinbcr carricd in any one month
was in November-40,ooo men, 8,000 animals, and 20,800,
ooo pouilds of storcs. Thc grcatcst n~imbcr of special
trains run in oilc day mas cight, carrying 4,100 men, 300
animals, and 800,mo poui~clsof storcs. As an instance of
rapid loading, when the 10th Bellgal Cavalry left for
Malta, 80 horscs were loadcd on a train in 10 minutes
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from the ordinary station platforn; the pack-ponies gave
more trouble, having in some cases to be picked up bodily
and pushed into the car. T h e averagc time taken in
loading up a squadron of cavalry, cotnprising 8 oficers,
128 meil, 92 followers, 150 horses, and 10,800 pounds of
baggage and ammunition, was from I hour t o go minutes.
Great difiiculty was found ill loading camels, for which
a sling and crane is required. Thc specd of troop-trains
was about 21 miles an hour. No accidents occurred.
Mr. Ross stated that in case of emergency, 11 trains each
way, could be run over the Lahore and Mooltan sectiol~,
and 15 trains each .way ovcr t l ~ cLahorc and Delhi section ; this was the maximuin iluinbcr of trains capable of
20 miles an hour wit11 35 cars, allowiilg for crossiilgs and
other necessary halts. At this rate 3 batteries of artillery, 2 regiments of cavalry, and 5 regiments of inlantry
(7,000 men), could bc concentrated a t Lahore every 24
hours. And by this line alone, 70,000 men, with gulls,
horses, and storcs cornpletc, could be brought to Lahore
in 10 days. As the nativc troops prcfcr cars without
seats, ordinary box-cars are always ready ; 30 to 35 natives,
or 8 horses, can be carried in a car. This is thc railway leading to I<urrachee, the scaport nearest to Quctta.
Experience has shot1711 that t11c1-eis but little troublc t o
accumulate large storcs of provisions for an army; particularly in or near the Inclo-Afghan frontier, providccl thcre
is a force t o distribute it. Compressecl food and forage
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will form part of the present British supplies. MecIicinc
was oftcn deficicnt and illiberally issued.
I~ztclli,neclzcr.-D~iri~lgthc later campaigns in R f g l ~ a n i s t a ~ ~
thc British Commanding Gencral has been invested witli
supreme political authority, and the Political Departmcllt
(which is a branch of the Foreign Departnlc~ltof thc GOVemmcnt of India) has been undcr his coatrol; a political
officer was gcnerally assigned t o the staff of each in&pcndellt army commander, and lias had charge of all inilitaiy iatclligencc; these officers were familiar with thc
language and habits of the Afghans, and wcrc also useful
in obtaining supplies from the nativcs. The inforlnatioll
obtained daily, ill this way and through the ordinary military scouts, was silted and compilecl in the QuartermasterGencral's office for the information of thc Commanding
General. Maps of the country were supplied to all '
officcrs. T h e I-Icliograph was used with markcd success
in sigllalling in that mountaillous country. Messagcs
wcre sent from Kabul to Jamrud, 190 miles, with but four
intermediate stations, and again between Kabul a i d Gundainuck, seventy-five milcs, with but one station. Our illformation as t o the status of the Political Officer is based
upon a report made by Col. Chapman, R. A., but is supplernented by the views of Lieut. Maltin, R. E., who
scrved with thc same column. R e says:
" Thc old English respect for law and constitutcd civil
authority is olten carricd to extravagance, and notably in
India, where the Roman inaxinl 'Inter armcs silent leges,'
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appears to have been clean forgotten. T h e Politicals
were by no mcalls silcnt, and the alnoullt of ltnowledge
they possessed of border statistics was something marvellous. Dicl any step appear to the military scnsc advisable,
there was a lnuch bcttcr, t l ~ o ~ gless
h colnprchensible,
political reason why it should not be ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ c r t aThe
kcn.
oracle has spolicn and the behest must be obeyccl. All
enemy in sight who 1~ccamc'afterw:~rds
hostile, must not
be ltcpt at a distance; tllrougll political glasses they
appear as ' cllildren of naturc,' while thc coulltry out of
sight must not be cxplored, the susceptibilities of the sensitivc ' Tamlnizais ' having to be rcspectecl. That much
valuable service was pcrforined by political officers therc
can be no doubt, but that thcy causcd great exasperation
among soldiers cannot bc dcnied, and the cxamplc of the
War of 1839-40 causes thcm to be looked upon as a very
possiblc sourco of danger."
A7tgZu-AfgLa7t O]cmtiu~~s.--The observations of a participant {+ in t11c last British camlmigu in Afgllanistan will
be founcl of value in thc study of futurc operations in that
country. Of the Afghan tactics 11c says : " T h c enemy
(generally spealiing, a. rncc of Highlanders) vastly preferred
thc attacli, and usually obtaincd Ihc advantage of supcrior
numbers bcforc risliing an attacli ;
'::' {; bcing able
to dispensc (for the time) wit11 lincs of com~nunicationand
baggage and commissariat columns, t11c Afghan tribcs
wore oftcn ablc t o rnisc 1:ugc g:~thcrings on chosen
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groul~d. T h e y could always attaclc u s ; we werc rarely
(except whcn they chose) t o find thein at hornc."
This observer says t h e regular troops of the Arncer were
llot so forinidable as t h e tribal gatherings. Thc prcsence
of a tactically i~nrnovableartillery hinders the actioil of
a11 Asiatic army. Tllc mounted ~ n c nare usually the first
to leave whell thc fight is going against their side in a
general engagement. Ollc of the best spccinle~lsof thcir
tactics was at Ahmed-Rlleyl, on the Ghazni-Kandahar
road, whcn the British divisioll was one hundred miles
from any support. T h e Afghans assembled a force outnuinbering the British tcn to one. T h e attaclc was inadc
in a scries of rushes, twice dispersing the British cavalry,
and oncc driving back thc infantry. Exposed t o a constant fire of ficld guns, the Afghans stood their ground,
nlthough poorly armed wit11 n varicty of obsolete weapons
-from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble may
always bc expected froin the night attacks of certain
tribes like the Alizais and Waziris.
T h c English infantry formatioil was an objectionably
close one, and Licut. Martin says that the bayonets and
rifle-barrels of thc iront ranlc were sometimes struck and
jammed by 6zdZets fro7rs the rtTnr rnltk. T h e action of
the English cavalry, as at Ahmcd-Khcyl, was suicidal in
rcceivitlg t h e enemy's cl~asge-pr.actically a t a halt. Occasionally shelter trenches were used, but disapprovcd.
In the ICurain valley column, under Gencral Roberts,
the cavalry (principally native, with one rcgular squadron
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and a battery of horse artillery) formed a brigaclc, but was
never used indcpendcntly, nor was it instructccl (altl~ougl~
well equipped) for mocleril cavalry work. T h e opposition
to dismounted cavalry duty is still so grcat, in the British
army, tllat tllc mouilted arm is paralyzed for effective
service.
Very little was done by tlle horse artillery with the
I<uram column. In thc case of tlle field artilleiy it was
found necessary 011 two occasioils t o transfer t h e ammuilition boxes fro111 the bullocl<-cartst o the baclrs of elephants,
011 account of the steepness of the hills.
T h e mountain
artillery (native) was tlle most serviceable ; a Gatling battery, paclted on ponics, and in charge of n detachment of
Highlanders, was nevcr uscd howcvcr.
T h e armament of tllc infantry ii~clucloclboth Martini
and Snidcr rifles, recluiring two Kil~clsof ammunition, but,
as t h e scrvicc by pacli-mules was ainplc, no confusion cnsued, althougl~Licut. Martin says : " In one case I heard
a wl~isperthat LL 1,cgirncntal reserve of ammunition was
found to be Bl~t7zkcnrts~idgcs,but this must be a heavy
jolrc." I i l t r c n c l ~ i ~tools
~ g were carricd on camels. A
mixture of military aild civil-enginccr administratio11 and
operation is lncntioncd :IS unsatisfactory in results. There
was great difficulty in gcttiilg tools and inaterials a t the
opcning of thc campaign-particularly thosc rcquircd for
road and bridgc work, althougll a railroad within two hundrccl milcs had a largc stoclr on hancl.
T h e art of camping aild rough fortification was well
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practised. The best defended camp was surrounded by
bus11 abatis and flanlted by half-moon sul~gusof bouIderstone work, which held the sentries. T h e most approved
permanent camps or " posts " were mud scrub flanlred by
bastions at the alternate angles and overlooltiilg a yard or
"kraal." These were established about ten miles apart,
to protect communications, and furnished frequent patrols.
During the latter part of the campaign these outposts
were manned by the native contingents of the Punjab
who vol.unteered.
The rapid march of General Roberts from Kabul t o
Kandahar in August, 1880, and the final dispersion of t h e
forces of Ayoub Ichan, illustrated British operations in Afghanistan under the most favorable circurnstanccs. T h e
forces includecl 2,800 European and 7,000 Indian troops ;
no wheeled artilIeiy was talcen ; one regiment of native iAfantry, trained to practical engineering work, did the work
of sappers and miners ; for t h e trailsportation of sick and
wounded 2,000 doolie-bearci-s, 2% ponies, and 43 donkeys ;
for transport of supplies a paclr-train of 1,589 yabas, 4,s 10
mules, 1,224 Indian ponies, 912 donkeys-a
total of
10,148 troops, 8,143 native followers, and I 1,224 animals,
including cavalry horses ; 30 days' rations, of certain
things, and dependence on t h c country for fresh meat and
forage. The absence of timbcr on this route rendered it
difficult to obtain fuel except by burning the roofs of t h e
villages and digging up tlle roots of " Southern-wood "
for this purpose. The manner of covering the movement

.s surrounded by
6;rzgasof boulder.
~eIllOst approved
sc7nis flanlted by
lo0 k i l l g a yard or
tell miles apart,
L f r c q u e l l t patrols,
kl tI1esc outposts
ts of the Punjab

;

from Kabul to

d i s p c r s i o n of tile
o p c s a t i o n s in A[.

:um s t a n c e s . TIle
I n d i a n troops;
n e n t of native ii.
.o
rlc, did the work
: a t i o n of sickand
, a n d 43 donkeys;
c ,5 S g yabfis, 4,510
c c y s - a total of
d I 1,224 animals,
.ti o n s , of certain
'or Ircsh meat a~ld
r c , 11 tc rcndered it
g t h c roofs of the
S outhcnl-wood"
r l g t11c lnovemcnt

3

84

A FG1.A N J S T A N .

rested with the cavalry commander. Usually t h e front
was covcred by two rcgirncnts, one regiment on each
flank, at a mile from the column, detaching one or more
troops as rear-guard ; once movemerlt had commenced, the
animals, moving at different gaits were chcclred as little as
possible. With such a number of non-combatants the
column was strung out for six or seven miles, and the
rear-guard lcavirlg onc camp a t 7 A.M. rarely reached t h e
next-fiftccn to twenty miles distant-before sundown.
Xoutes.--For
operations in Afghanistan the general
British basc is the frontier from I<urrachce to Peshawur.
These points are conilected by a railway running east of
the Indus, which forms a natural boundary t o t h e Indiap
frontier, supplemented by a line of posts whicl~are from
north t o south as follows: Jumrud, Baru, Mackeson,
Michni, Shub I<adar, Abazai, and I<ohut ; also by fortified
posts connected by military roads,--Thull,
Bunnoo, and
Doaba.
From the Indus valley into the interior of Afghanistan
there are only four lines of coinmunicatioil which can be
called military roads : first, from Pcshnwz~rthrough the
Ichaiber Pass to Knbzd; second, froin ThzdZ, over the
Pciwar and Slluturgurdan passes t o Knbldl; third, from
Dern IsnzniZ Khnfz through the Gulcir Surwandi and
Sargo passes to Ghnani; fourth, b y Qzlettn to I<andal~ar
and thence t o f i ~ n t or
, by Gl~aznit o Iinbzd. Bcsidcs
these there are inany stccp, difficult, mulc traclcs ovcr the
bleak, barren, Sulirnani range, which on its castern side
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is very precipitous and impassable for any large body of
troops.
The Peshawur-Icabul road, I 70 miles long, was in 1880
improved and put in good order. Frorn Peshawur the

ii

I

road gradually rises, and after 7 miles reaches Jumrud
(1,650 fect elevation), and 44 miles further west passes
through the great Ichaiber Pass. This pass, 31 miles
long. can, however, be turned by going t o the north
through the Absuna and Tartars passes ; they are not
practicable for wheels, and the first part of the road along
thc Kabul Rivcr is very difficult and narrow, being closed
in by precipitous cliffs.
As iar as Fort Ali Musjid the Ichaiber is a narrow defile between perpendicular slate rocks 1,460 feet high ; beyond that fort the road becomes stiIl morc difficult, and
in some of the narrowest parts, aIong the roclcy beds of
torrents, it is not inore than 56 feet wide. Five miles
furthcr it passes through the valley of LaIabeg I + miles
wide by 6 miles long, and then after rising for four miles it
]-caches the top of the Pass, which froin both sides offers
very strong strategical positions., From thence it descends for 2+ miles to the village of Landi I<hana (2,463
feet), which li@sin a gorge about a quarter of a mile
wide ; then on to Daklca (altitude 1,979 feet). This pass,
IOO to 225 feet wide and 60 feet long, is shut in b y steep
but not high slopes, overgrown with bushes.
On the eleven miles' march from Daltlta to I-Iazarnao, the
Khurd Khaiber is passed, a decp ravine about onc mile
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about one mile

long, and in many places so narrow that two horsemen
cannot pass each othcr. Hazarnao is wcll cultivated, and
rich in fodder; 15 inilcs farther is Chardeh (1,800 feet
altitude), from which t l ~ croad passcs through a wcll-cultivated country, and on through the desert of Surlth Denltor (1,892 feet altitude), which is over 8&miles from Jelalabad. From this city (elsewhere described) onward as far
as Gundarnuclt the route prcsents no great difficulties ; it
passes through orcl~arcls,vineyards, and cornfields t o the
Surlthab River ; but beyond this thrcc spurs of the Safed
ICoh range, running in a northeastern direction, have t o
be surmounted.
and Kabul two roads can be
Between Jelalabad
followed: the first crosses the range over the ICarkacha
Pass (7,925 fcet alt.) at the right of which is Assin
Kilo, tl~cnccthrougl~t l ~ cICotul defile, and ascellding the
Ichurd 1cabul-f (7,397 fcct alt.) to the north rcaches
the high plateau on which Icabul is situated ; the other
leads over the short but dangerous Jagdallalt Pass to
Jagdallalt, froin which thcrc are three roads t o Kabult l ~ cnorthernmost over the Ichinar and the third over the
Sokhta passes; all these, more difficult than the IChaiber,
arc impassable during the winter. I t was here, as already
rclatcd, that the greater part of Elphinstone's command,
in 1842, perished. T11cre is a dearth of fucl and supplics

1
i

1

li

!I

"

"Tllc hcal at Jclalabad froin the end o l April is trcmcncloas-105'
to
110" in thc sllncle.
.( 'The ICl~urd1Cal)ul Pass is abonl hvc milcs long, with an i~npcluous
mountain torrent which the road (1842)crosscd twcniy-eight ti~ncs.
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b y this line of communication. T h c seconcl, or ThullJ(uram-ICabul, rAute, was taken by Gcneral Roberts in
1878-9. I t extends from Thull, one of the frontier posts
already mentioned, some forty miles into the ICuram
valley, a i d then inclining towards t h e west leads t o the
~ C L Ifort
S ~(Mohammeclr
~
Azim's), a wallcd quadrangular
fortrcss with flanking towers at an elevation of 6,000 feet.
T h e Icuram valley is, up to this point, wcll cultivated and
productive ; wood, water, 2nd forage abound. Winter
only lasts with any severity for six weeks, and the Spring
and Autumn are delightful.
A short distance above the fort coinmenccs the ascent
toward the Peiwar Pass (8,ooo feet alt.), twenty-four
miles distant. The road, thiclcly bordcred with cedar and
pine trees, is covered with bouldcrs and is very difficult,
and from the village of Peiwar-one of inany en route, of
t h e usual Afghan fortified type-it lcads through a winding defile to the top of the pass. Ilere the road is confined
by perpendicular chalk rocks, the summits of which are
covered with scrub timber and a luxurious growth .of
laurel. On the farther side of the pass the road ascends
t o the height of the Hazardaralht, (which is covered with
snow in the winter), and then climbs t o the Shuturgusdan
Pass ( I 1,375 fcet alt.), reaching a plateau on which t h e
snow lies for six months of the yeas ; thence it descends
into the fertile Logar valley and reachcs Akton I ~ l i e l ,
which is only fifty-one miles from Kabul. T h e total
length of this route is about 175 miles.

I

\

THE BRITISZ FORCES .4ND ROUTES.

l e a d s to tlic

~ltivaf:
ed and
nd.
Willter

:s t h e ascent
twenty-four
th cedar and
cry difficult,
z
Y O , of
)ugh a wind.

~f w h i c h are
.oacZ ascends

.I

w h i c h the

i

I

i
i

j

j

,i

T11e third, or Dera-Ismail-I<han-Sargo-Ghazni, route
passes through a region less frequented than those mentionecl, and is not thought sufficiently difficult for
detailed description. Passing due west, through seventy
of mountain gorges destitute of supplies or forage,
i t debouches, through the Gomal Pass, into a more
prornisiilg country, in which forage may be obtained. A t
this point it branches t o Ghazni, Kandahar, and Pishin
respectively. A road exists from Mooltan, crossing the
lndus at Dera-Ghazi-Khan, Mithunltot, Rajanpur, Rojan,
Lalgoshi, Daclur to Quetta, and was utilized by General
Biddulph, irom whose account of his march from the
Indus to the Helmund, in 1879, is gleaned the following.
T h e inain point of concentratioi~for the British forces,
either from India or from England via Kurrachee is thus
~ninutelydescribed.
" T h e wcstcril frontier of India is, for a length of
600 miles, bounded by Biluchistan and territories inhabited b y Bilucll tribes, and for 300 miles Biluch
country intervenes between our border and Afghanistan.
The plains of the Punjab aild Sind run along the boundary
of Biluchistan, and at a distance of from 25 to 50 miles the
Indus pursues a course, as far down as Mithunlcot, from
north to south, and then winds south-west through a
countiy similar t o that of Egypt. A belt of cultivation
and beyond that the clesert ++ *E
this line of hills (the
+
+

.
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an elevatioll of I 1,000 feet a t t h c Tukl-i-Sulirnan, and of
7,400 ncar Fort Munro (opposite Dcra-Ghazi-Khan), gradually dimitlislles in llcight and dwitldlcs away till it is lost
in the plains ncar Icusmore, at a point 12 inilcs from the
Illdns. The strip of low-land country on t h e west bank
of t h e Ii~dusup t o the foot of the hills is called the
Derajat. I t is cut up and brokcil by torrcnts, the beds of
wl~icllare generally dry wastcs, and the country is, cxcept
at a few places where permanent water is found, altogether
sterile ancl hot. If we vicw t h e physical aspect looking
llorth and nortll-west from Jacobabad, we notice a wide
bay of plains extending betwcen the brolcen spur of the
Sulimani, and a second range of hills having a direction
parallel to the outer range. This plain is called the
I<achi, extencls in an even surface for 150 milcs from the
Indus at Sukltur, and is bouncled on the north by successive spurs lying between the two grcat ranges. The
Icachi, thus boundcd by barren hills on all sides b u t the
south, is one of the hottest rcgioils in the world. Except
where subject to i~lulldationsor withia I-cach of irrigation
it is completely sterile-a hard clay surface called P&t,and this kind of countrjr cxtcnds around to the east of the
spur of the S u l i ~ n a into
~ l t h e Dcrajat country. Subject t o
terrific heats ancl t o a ficrccly h o t pcstilcntial ~vind,tlie
Icachi is at times fatal cvcn t o t h e nativcs."
T h e range of inouiltains bouncling thc Icachi t o the
westward is a colltilluous wall wit11 impcrccptible breaks
only, and it bears the local names of Ginclari, Takari, and
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Entrance to the Rolan Pass, from Dadur.
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Kirthar. Through this uniform rampart there are t w o
notable rents or defiles, viz. : tlle Mzdfa opening opposite
Gundana, leading to Icelat ; and the Bofalz entering ncalDadur, leading to Quctta, Kandahar, and Herat. T h e
Bolan is an abrupt defile-a rent in the range,-the bottom filled with the pebbly bed of a inountaiil torrent.
This steep ramp forms for sixty iniles the road from
Dadur, elevation 750 fcet, t o the Dasht-i-Bedowlat, elevation 6,225 feet. This inhospitable plateau and the upper
portion of the Bolan are subject t o the most piercingly
cold winds and temperature; and the sudden change
from the heat of the Icachi t o thc cold above is most
trying to the strongest constitutions. Notwithstanding
the difficulties of the road, the absencc of supplics and
fuel, and thc hostile character of thc prcdatory tribes.
around, this route has bcen always most in favor as t l ~ e
great commercial and military cominunication from Persia,
Central Asia, and Khorassan t o India.
The causes which led to the establishment of a British
garrison at Quetta are not unlilte those which are urged
as good Russian reasons for the occupation of territory
in certain parts of Central Asia. Bricfly stated, i t scems
that after the conquest of the Punjab, the proximity of
certain disturbed portions of Biluchistan, and the annoyance suffered by various British illilitary expeditions, i n
1839-1874, from certain tribes of Biluchis-notably
the
Maris and Bugtis,-made it desirable that morc decisive
measures should be adopted. In 1876 a forcc of British
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troops was marched to Kelat, and b y mutual agreement.
the Khan a political agency was established at
Quetta, ostensibly t o protect an important coinmercia~
highway, but a t the same time securing a military footing
of great value. But the character of the lords of the soil
--the Maris, for instance-has not changed for the better,
and the temporary general Europeai~occupation of the
countrywould afford an opportunity t o gratify their preda-.
tory instincts, which these bandits would not hesitate to,
utilize. T h e Maris can put 2,000 Inell into the field and
march roo miles to m a l e an attack. When they wish tb
start upon a raid they collect their wise men together and
tell the warriors where the cattle and the corn are. If the.
reports of spies, sent forward, confirm this staterncnt, the.
march is undertaken. They ride upon mares which m a l e
no noise ; they travel only at night. They are the most
excellent outpost troops in the world. Urhen they arrive
at the scene of action a perfect watch is kept and informa-.
tion by single messengers is secretly sent back. Every
thing being ready a rush of horseinen talces place, t h e villages are surrounded, the cattle swept away, the women
and children hardly used-fortunate
if they escape
with their lives. T h e villagers have their fortlets tor
retreat to, and, if they reach them, call pull the ladders over after them and fire away from their towers..
Dadur is an insignificant town at the foot of the Bolan.
From here the Kandahar road leads for sixty miles
'
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through the Pass-a

gradual ascent; in winter there is

not a mouthful of food in the cntire length of thc defile.
Quetta, compared with thc rcgion to the south, appears
a very Garden of Eden. I t is a small oasis, grcen and
well watered.
From Quetta t o Pisliin the road skirts thc southern
border of a vast plain, interspersed with valleys, which
extend across the eastern portion of Afghanistan toward
the Russian dominion. A study of thc Pishin country
sllows that it is, on its northwesterll side supported on a
limb of the Western Sulimani. This spur, which defines
the west of the Barshorvalley, is spread out into t h c broad
plateau of Toba, and is then produced as a continuous
ridge, dividing Pishin froin thc plains of ICadani, under the
name of IChoja Amran. Thc Barshor is a dcep bay of
the plain, and there is an open valley within t h e outer
screen of hills. A road striltcs off here t o the Ghilzai
country and t o Ghazni. Though intersected b y some
very low and unimportant hills and ridges, the Pishin
plains and those of Shallltot may be loolted upon as one
feature. W e may imagine the Shall Valley the vestibule,
the ICujlalt-Icaltur Vale the passagc, the Gayud Yara Plain
an antechambcr, and Pishin proper the grcat snZZe. SLITrounded by mountains which givc forth an abundant supply of water, the lands bordering on the hills are studded
with villages, and there is much cultivation; there is a
total absence of timber, and the cultivation of fruit-trees
has becri neglected. T h c Lora rivcrs cutting into t h e
plain interferes somewhat with t h e constructioil of roads.
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The Plain of Pishin possesses exceptional advantages
for the concentratioil and rendezvous of large bodies of
troops, and has already been utilized for that purpose b y
t h e British.
From the Ichoja Amran, looking toward Kandahar, t h e
plains, several thousand feet below, are laid out lilte a sea,
and the mountains run out into isolatccl promontories ; to
the left the desert is secn lilte a turbulent tide a b o u t t o
overflow the plains.
The rivers on .the Quetta-Randahar route d o not
present much impediment ,to the passage of troops i n d r y
weather, but in flood $hey ':become serious obstacles and
cannot be passed until (the ;waters retire.
The ascent from the east through the IChojak Pass is
easy, the descent on the west very precipitous. A thirteen-foot cart road was made, over the entire lcngth of
twenty miles, b y General Bicldulph in 1878-9, by which
the first wheeled vehicles, which ever reached IChorassan
from India, passed.
From ICandahar (elsewhere described)-which is considered by General I-Iamley and other authorities, one of the
most important strategic points in any scheme of pcrmanent defence for India-divergc two maill roads: o n e a
continuation of the Quetta-Herat route bearing N, W.,
and one running N. E. to Icabul.
Gen. Biddulph says: " T h e position of I C a n d a l ~ ancar
~
t o the slopes of the range to the westward of t h e city
,renders it impossible to construct worlcs close a t hatld

1

~
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to cover thc road from Herat. T h e high ridgc and outlying hills dividing I<andahar and its suburbs from thc
Argandab valley completely command all the level
ground between the city and the pass. Beyond the
gap a group of detached momltains extends, ovcrloolting
t h e approaches, and follows the left bank of the Argandab
as far down as Panjwai, fifteen milcs distant. Positions
for defensive worlts must be sought, therefore, in front
of that place on the right bailk of the river. T o the N.
E. of ICandahar thc open plain affords situations for
forts, well removed from the hills, at a short distance,
and a t Rlthund Ziarut, thirty miles on the road to Ghazni,
there is a gorge which would, if held, add to security
on that quarter."
T h e country between ICandahar and the I-Ielmund has
t h e same general characteristics-plains
and mountain
spurs alternately,-and while generally fit for grazing is,
except in a few spots, unfit for cultivation.
According t o the eminent authority just quoted, the
great natural strategic feature of this route is the elevated position of A t t a Icarez, thirty-one miIes from ICandahar, H e says: "On the whole road this is the
narrowest gateway,, and this remarltable feature and the
concentratioil of roads* here, give to Atta Icarez a strategic
* T h e roads which meet at Atta 1Carez are: the great IIerat higllway
passing tl~roughIColccran and crossing the Argandab opposite Sinjari, whence
it lies along the open plain all the way to Atta Icarer ; the road which
crosses the Argandal, at Panjwai; and the road from Taktipul towards

importance unequalled by any other spot betweell India
and Central Asia."
General Biddulph examined this position carefully in
1879, aild discovered a site for a work which would command the valley of the Argandab and swcep the
elevated open plain toward the west and nortl~wcst.
Abbaza is a village at t h e crossing of the I-Icrat road
over the Helmund, forty-six miles west of A t t a Icarez.
011
the west balllc lies the ancient castle of Girishk. The
country between the Argaildab and the I-Ielmuncl is rolling and inclining gradually from t h e hills toward the junction of these rivers. T h e plateau opposite Girishk is 175
feet above the river, which i t commands.
T h e Helmund has already beell described. There are
numerous fords, but, at certain times, bridges would be
required for military purposes. T h e land in the vicinity
of the Helmund is vely fertile and searnecl with irrigating
canals.
From Girishk a road via Washir runs through the
hills t o Herat ; this is said to be cool, well supplied
with water and grazing, and is a favorite military route.
A road, parallel, to the soutl~,gocs tl~roughFxrrah, beyond which both roads blend illto one main roacl t o the
" I<ey.ll Still another road, by Bost, Rudbar, and
Lash, along the course of t h e river, cxists. Although not
so direct, it is an important route to Ilerat ; upon this
road stand the ruins of the ancient city of Bost in a wonderful state of preservation; here, as elsewhere in this
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region, the remains of fortifications testify t o t h e former
military importance of the spot. The citadel of Bost is
built on the debris of extensive worlcs and rises 150 feet
above the river.
B~itishGe~zcml~.--Perhaps the most prominent of modern British commanders, next to Lord Wolseley-is the
young and successful soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir
Fredericlc Roberts, G. C. B., C. I. E., commanding the
Anglo-Indian Army of the Madras Presidency. H e has
already seen service in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and
has been appointed t o the coillmand of one of the principal divisions of the British forces intended t o oppose the
threatened advance of the Russians on I-Ierat. I t was
said of him by one of the most brilliant military leaders
of the age,-Sltobeleff : " For General Roberts I have a
great admiration. H e seems t o me t o possess all the
qualities of a great general. That was a splendid marc11
of his from Kabul t o Icandahar. I think more highly of
him than I do of Sir Garnet Wolseley, but there is this to
be said of a l l your generals, they have only fought against
Asiatic and savage foes. They have not commanded an
army against a European enemy, and we cannot tell,
therefore, what they are rcally made of."
The Commander-in-chief of the Army of India, General
Sir Donald M. Stewart, G. C. B., C. I. B., to whom has
been intrusted the conduct of the 13ritish forces in
Afghanistan, is also a vely distinguished and experienced
officer-probably
more familiar with tlie nature of the
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probable field of operations than any other in Her Majesty's Serviee.
Lilce the United States, t h e great latent power of England is indisputable, and so long as superiority at sea is
maintained, time is given to render that latent power
active. For the first year of t h e coming struggle England
must lean heavily upon her navy. Nearly all the regiments of infantry are below the average peace limit, and
if filled up simultaneously t o a, inaximum war strength
will include more than fifty per cent. of imperfectly
trained men, and as the practice llas been t o fill up those
corps ordered abroad with men transferred from other
small regiments, it inay come to pass that so-called " regular" regimcnts will consist largely of raw material.
Colonel Trench of the British Army says "the organization
of the regular cavalry is very defective," and especially
cornplaiils of the maladministration we have just noted.
r e by a heavy
Demands for cavalry for the S ~ u c l a n ~ w e met
drain on the already depleted strength of regiments in
England. The Fifth Dragoon Guards, which stood next
dred horses and onc hundred men. Colonel Trench says
that the reserve cavalry have no training, and that there
is no reserve of horses. I t is doubtful if more than
seventy per cent. of the enlisted strcngtl~and fifty per
cent. of the horses, on paper, could be p u t in t h e field
now.
Allusion has already been made t o the notorious wealr-
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ness of the British transport system." If this has, been
the case i n the numerous sinall wars in which her forces
have been engaged for the last twenty-five years, what
may be expected from the strain of a great international
campaign.
On the other hand, Great Britain can boast of an inexllaustible capital, not alone of the revenues which have
been accumulatillg cluriilg t h e last quarter of a century,
but of patriotism, pllysical strength, courage, and endurance, peculiar t o a race of conquerors.
A

Levies in the Afghan
campaign, rccommcnded refo~rnsin the system of transport and supply.
1 - ~ eadvocated certain Alncrican methods, as wiild nncl water-mills to crus!~
and cleanse the pet~ificdand gravelled I)arley, often issued, and tocut up the
infc~iorhay ; thc selection of tlansport employis who understand animals ;
and mole care in tra~lsporti~lg
liorses by sea.
4: Captain Gaisford, who cornr~>andedthe ICllaiber

i
IV.
THE RUSSIAN FORCES A N D APPROACHES.

A

I

MERE glance at the ponderous military machine with

which Russia cnforces law and ordcr within h c r vast
domain, and by which she preserves and cxtends hc1power, is all that we can give hcre.
No army in thc world has probably undcrgonc, \vithin
t h e last thirty years, such a successioll of extcnsivc altcrations in organization, in administrative arrangcmcnts, and
in tactical regulations, as that of Russia. T l ~ cCriincail
W a r surprised it during a period of transition. F u r t h e r
~ h a n g e sof importance were carried out after t h a t war.
Once more, in 1874, t h e wholc military systcm was rcmodelled, while ever since t h e Peacc of Szn Stcfano,
radical reforms have beell in progress, and have beell prosccuted with such fcverish haste, that it is dificult for t h e
observer t o keep pace wit11 t h e ~ n . ' ~
T h e militaiy system of Russia is based upon t l ~ princ
ciples of universal liability to scrve aacl of territorial distribution. This applies to the eiltirc lnalc population, with
cel-tain exemptions or modifications on t h e ground, rospectively, of age o r education. Annually thcro is a " lotdrawing," in which all ovcr twenty, who 11:~vcnot ;~lready

* Sir L. Graham (j%z~v~raZ
Roj/nC U.S. It~stitntion).
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drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanks are
excused from service with the colors, but go into the last
reserve, or " OpoltscheniC."
Tlie ordinary term of service is fifteen years,-six with
thc colors and nine with the reserves ; a reduction is made
for men serving a t remote Asiatic posts ; the War Office
may se~lclsoldiers into the reserve before the end of thcir
terms. Reduction is also made, from eleven to thirteetl
years and a hall, for various degrees of educatioilal acquirement. Exemptions are also made for family reasons and
on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Individuals who persoilally manage their estates or direct
their ow11 commercial affairs (with the exceptioil of venders
of strong liquors) may have their entry into service
postponed two years. Men are permitted t o volunteer
a t scventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); all
volunteers serve iliile years in the rescrve; those joining
the Guards or cav'alry must maintain thenlselves a t their
own expense. T h e total contingent demanded for army
a n d navy in ISSO was 235,000, and 231,.961 were enrolled ;
of this deficit of 3,039, the greater number, 3,000, were
Jews.
Org-a?zizatio~z.-The
Emperor is the Coinmander-inChief, who issues orders through the War Ministry, whose
head is responsiblc for the gcneral efficiency of the Army.
There is also t h e " Imperial Head-quarters," under a
general officer who, in the absence of the War Minister,
talccs the Emperor's orders and sees to their execution.
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T h e W a r Council, presided over by the W a r Minister,
superviscs all financial matters in connection wit11 the army.
There are also a Iligll Court of Appeals, and the I-Ieadquarters Staff, who supervise tlle execution of all military
duties. Commissariat, artillcry, engineer, medical, military education, Cossack, and judgc-advocate departments
complete the list of bureaus.
T h e military forces are arrangcd into nineteen army
corps : five coniprise three divisioils of inlantry ;. one, two
divisions of cavalry; t h e remainder, two divisions of
cavalry and onc of infantry ; with a duc proportion of
light artillery and engineers t h e war strcngth of a n army
corps is 42,303 combatants, 10,755 horses, and 108 guns.
When war is declared a n army is formed of two or more
corps. T h c gencral cominanding exercises supreme colttrol, civil and military, if the force cnters the enemy's
country. I-Iis staff are detailed much as usual at a n
American army head-quarters in tlie field.
Thcre are in thc active army-Infn~zt~y : 768 battalions
(192 regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. riflemen. Cnvnlry:
56 regular regimcnts (4 cuirassiers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48
dragoons); 29 regt. Cossaclts, divided into 20 divisions,
ltept in time of peace a t 768 mcll (864 wit11 sub-olficcrs)
per regiment. Artillcry .* 5 I brigades, or 303 batteries of
8 guns each ; 30 horse-batteries of 6 guns cach ; bcsidcs
I4 batteries wit11 Cossaclc divisions. Fifly "parks " and
2 0 sections of "parlcs" supply e a c l ~infantry brigadc and
cavaliy divisio~lwith cartridges.

A FCHA NIS TAN.

During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized.
Henceforward the peace establishment will cotlsist of seventeen battalions of sappers; eight battalions of pontollicrs;
sixteen field-telegraph companies, each of whicI1 is
mounted, so as to maintain tclegraphic communicatiotl for
forty miles, a i ~ dhavc two stations ; six engineering
or trains, each ten sections, carrying each sufficient tools
and material for an infatltry division; four battalions of
military railway engineers; four mine companies ; two
siege trains, and one telegraph instruction company. The
whole is divided into six brigades, and provisions are
taken for training recruits and supplying the losses during
war. The fortress troops, for the dcfencc of fortresses,
consist of forty-three battalions of twelve hundred men
each in time of war, and nine compznies of three hundred
men each. T h e depot troops, for garrison service, consist of thirteen battalions and three hundred detachments.
T h e reserve troops supply 204 battalioils of infantry,
56 squadrons of cavalry, 57 batteries of artillery, a n d 34
companies of sappers. If mobilized, they are intended to
supply 544 battalions, 56 squadrons, 1 4 .batteries, and 34
companies of engineers. T h e second reserve, o r Zapas,"
consists of " cadres " for instruction, organized in time of
war.
T h e training of the Russian infantry comprises t h a t of
skirmishing as of most importance ; thc whistle is used to
call attention ; the touch is looser in the ranks than for-

\
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Berdan breech-loader is the infantry a r m ; sergcantmajors wear officers' swords, and togetlzer with musicians
carry revolvers.
R great stimulus has bcen given to rifle practice in the
Russian army, with fair results, but complaint is made of
want of good instructors. T h e dress and equipment of
the infantry is noted for an absence of ornament, and
lloolts arc substituted for buttons. Every thing has
been made subordinate t o comfort: and convenience,
Woolleil or linen bandages are worn instead of socl~s.
T h e entire outfit of the soldier weighs about fifty pounds.
T h e Guai-ds, alone, are yet permitted to wear their old
uniform with buttons. T h e arms of the Turlrestan troops
are mixed Berdan and Bogda11 rifles. The field clothing
is generally linen blouse wit11 cloth shoulder-straps,
chamois-leather trousers, dyed red, and a white kCpi.
Officers wear the same trousers in the field. Cossaclrs
wear gray shirts of camel's hair.
T h e artillery is divided into field artillery and horse
artillery, of which the strength is given elsewhere. T11e
horse batteries have the steel four-pound gun.
I n Russia it
Col. Lurnley, of t h e British arAy, says :
is believed that the field artillery is equal t o that of any
other Power, and the horse artillery superior." Lieut.
this opinion.

*

A Britisli officer, who has had good opportunities, says the infantry drill
is sccond to none.

I t is not too much to say that, in any European conflict
in tlze near future, the Russian cavalry will be conspicuous
and extraordinarily effective. 111 a war with England, in
Asia, the use of large bodies of cavalry, organized, instructed, and equipped after the American plan, must become the main feature.
From the wonderful reforms instituted by Russia in her
huge army of horsemen, w l ~ i c lhave
~
put her before all
other nations, not excepting Germany, we may expcct to
hear of wonderful mobility, stunning blows at the enemy's
depots, and the appropriation of choice positions under
his nose : of stubboril contests with the Anglo-Indian
infantiy, the only weapoil a Bcrdan carbine; of communications destroyed by high explosives : especially, of the
laying waste smiling Afghan valleys, inexpedieilt to occupy:-thcse are a few of the surprises to which we may be
treated if Russia gets the chance. In this manner she is
doubtless prepared to talte the initiative in hcr next war.*

* The bold operations of General Gourlco in the Russo-Turkish war of
1878, afford Lhe best illustration of the versatile qualities of the progressive
military l~orsemun since the American war, 1861-5. A11 Austrian officer
says: "The Russian cavalry reconnoitred boldly and continuously, and
gave proof of an initiative veryremarlcable. Every one lcnows that Russian
dragoons are merely foot soldiers mounted, and only half horsemen : however, that it should conle to such a point as maltiog dragoons charge with
the hayonel, such as took place July 16th near Twardista, seems strange.
Cossaclcs and Hussars dismounted on the got11, formed slcirmisl~inglines,
coming and going under the fire of infantry, protecting their buttery, and
conducting done an infantry fight against the enemy. At Eslci Zagra,
July grst, Lhe dragoons did not leave the field until all their cartridges were
exhausted. On the other hand, the oJertsive action, and Lhe spirit of enterprise and dash, which are the proper qualifications of cavalry, were not
wanting in Lhc Russians."
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Tlic whole of tile rcgulnr cnv:~lry of the li~ichas bccli
cotiverted into dmgootis artncd \vitl~ Ilcrdnii rifle ;~iid
bayonet ; t h e Gunrcl rcgilncnts ~ i i l ~ srldopt
t
the same
change when orclered into the ficld, and tlie Cossacks
have becn dcprivctl of tlie Inncc (cscepting for tlie front
rank) ; new ~ n u s k e t r yrcguIations have llcc11 prescribccl.
Great stress is noiv I:liJ ~ I P O I I tile tr;~itiingof both Ilorses
:~11cl men in tile direction of l o t ~ gm:~rclics,and t h e passage
of obstacles. Forced m;lrches arc also madc to cover
the greatest possible distn~lcesin tlie sllortcst possible
time.*
Sivilnming \v:ls p1-actisec1 in tlic IVarsam, O~lcssa,and
Moscow tlistricts, tllc horscs l~cingrcgul:l~.ly tilught nit11
tlic aid of inflntcd bags ticcl under thcln. T h c S~lprasl
was crossctl by tlic entire 4 t h Cavalry I.)ivision s~rimlning.
In ortlcr t o ncquirc n tliol.ough 1i110~lctlg~
of piottecr
duty, both tlic officers ancl non-comrnissioncd officers of
c;~valry ;[re nttnclicd to tlie c n ~ i ~ l c ccanlp
r
for :L sliort
course of instruction. In one division n regular pioneer
squa[lron has bccu formc~lfor telegraphic and hcliograpliic

*

Amoug o t l ~ c experi~nents
r
are noted that of 7 oficcrs aorl I.+ lncn of t l ~ c
Orcnl~urg Cossacks \vho in h'oren~bcr last in liatl \veatl~cr travelled 410
rersts l~ctrrcenNiji Novporod nltrl hfoscnrr ill 5 days-a11ont 5 3 rl~ilcs
n day; hen covering 635 versts from hfoscuw to St. Peteraburg in 8 days56 miles a tlny ; o n arrival an inspector ruportcd horses fresh and rcatly for
service ; the party was mentioned in orclcrs, and presented to the Czar.
A month before, in snow and it~tensccold, 7 oficers nnd 7 me11 of t l ~ ccavalry school covered 370 versts in 4 days-60 miles n clay. It is asserted that
the best Russian cnvnlry can trarcl 70 miles a day, continuonsly, without injury. General Gourko recently inspected two sotnias of Don Cossacks who
had cleared 340 versts i n 3 days, o r 74 miles a clay.

duty. The mounted force, provided for in t h e Russian
establishment, comprises twenty-one divisions of 3,503
sabres and 1 2 guns cach, o r an aggregate of 73,563 m c n
and 2 5 2 field guns.
A feature of the Russian cavalry equipment is t h e
pioneer outfit, consistilig of tools for constructio~l or
destruction, as they desire t o repair a bridge or destroy
a railroad : this outfit for each squadron is carried on
a pack-mule ; dynamite is carried in a cart with the ammullition train.
T h c Cossack (except of the Caucasus) is armed with
a long lance (front rank only), a sabre without guard, and
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a Berdan rifle. Those of the Caucasus have in addition
pistol and dagger, besides a ~zngashu or nativc whip.
The uniform is blue, high boots, fur cap, cloak with cape.
The snaffle-bit is universally uscd, even by tllc officcrs,
although the average Russian troop-horse is noted for
his hard mouth.
In t h e mounted drill of the Cossaclcs there is a charge
as skirmishers (or "foragers ") called the " lava,'' which is
executed at a great pace and with wild yells of " I-Iourra !
Lieut. Grierson, of thc British army, writes that : " A
big fine mail mountcd on a pony, with his body b c n t
forward and looking very top-heavy, always a t a gallop,
and waving his erlormous whip, t h e Cossaclc presents a n
almost ludicrous appearance to one accustomed. t o our
stately troopers. But this feeling is dashed with regret

1
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Transport a d Sz$pdy.-The
Russian system of transport is in a very experimental and unsatisfactory state.
I t is the only army which provides regimentally for the
persa7z7zel and ~n.ntPrieZof this department. I n each regiment is a non-combatant company, in which all men required for duty without arms are mustered.
All military vehicles required for the regiment are under
charge of this company. T h c intention of the systcm
now developing is to reduce t h e quantity ol transportation required." Besides the wagons and carts used for
ordinary movements of troops, Russia will, in Afghanistan,
depend upon t h e animals of the country for pack-trains
and saddle purposes. After the Cnmcl, of which large
numbers exist in t h e segion bordering Afghanistan on
the north, the most important aid t o Russian military
mobility is the reinarltable Kirghiz Harsc. T h e accounts
of the strength, speed, endurance, and agility of this little
animal are almost incredible, -1- but they are officially indorsed in many instances. H e is foui~din Turkestan, and
is more highly prized than any other breed. T h e Kirgbiz
horse is seldom more than fourteen hands, and, with the
exception of its head, is fairly symmetrical ; the legs are
exceptionaIly fine, and the hoofs well formed ancl hard as

1

I
I

I

,
1

I
I

I

* I n 1878 the head-quarters baggage of the Grand Dulie Nicholas required
five hundred vehicles and fifteen hundred horses to transport it.
111 1869 a Russian detachment of five hundred men, mounted on Kirglliz
Ilorses, wilh one gun and two ~.oclcet-stands,traversed in one month one thousand miles in the Orenburg Steppe. and only lost three horses ; halE of Lhis
march was in deep sand. I n October, M. Nogalr (a Rnssian oflicer) left his
detachment rn route, and rodc one horse into Irgiz, 166# miles in 34 11ours.
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iron. I t is seldom shod, and with bare feet traverses
the roughcst country with the agility of a chamois, leaping across wide fissures on the rocks, climbing thc steepest
heights, or picliing its way along mere sheep-tracks by the
side of yawning prccipiccs, or covering hundreds of versts
through heavy sand, with a heavier rider, day after day.
I t s gaits are a rapid and graceful walk of five and one half
t o six iniles an hour, and an amble-x at the maximum rate
of a mile in two minutes. This animal crosses the most
rapid streams not over three and one half fcet deep, lincd
with slippery boulders, with ease. They are good weight
carriers.? With a view of stimulating horse-breeding
in Turkcstan, the governmeilt in 1851 offered prizes for
speed.$ Icirghiz horses have been thoroughly tested in
the Russian army. For modern cavalry and horse-artillery
purposes they are unsurpassed. The average price is £6,
but an ambler will bring LIZ. Great Britain is said t o
possess z,8oo,ooo horses, while Russia, in the Kirghiz
steppes alone, possesses 4,000,000 sadclle or quick-draught
horses.
The supply of the Russian army is carefully arranged
under the central Intendance. The ration in the field was,
in 1878, 14.3 ounces of meat, 14.9 blaclc bread, preserved
vegetables.and tea, with an issue of brandy in the winter.
*Moving both feet on a side allnost simultaneously.
f The mounted messengers (pony express) over the steppes, use tllcse horses,
ancl carry with them, over stages of 350 miles in 8 days, an equipment a n d
supplies for man and horse of nearly 300 pounds.
$ The greatest speed recorded (1853,) was rg,j miles (on a measured course}
in 27 minutes and 30 seconds.
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Immense trains follow each division, at intervals, forming
consecutive mobile magazines oE food. A division provision train call carry ten days' supply ior zjo,ooo men.
Forage is now supplied for transport in compressed *
caltes, oE which ZO,OOO,OOO
were used by Russia in her last
war.
Clothing is furnished by the supply bureau of certain
regions in which there are large government factories ;
it is usual t o kccp on hand for an emergency 500,ooo sets
of uniform clothing.
Xoz~tcs.-I-Iaving devoted a share of our limited space
to an account of the roads leading t o Herat from India,we
may consider, briefly? certain approaches to Afghanistan
or India from the northwest. This subject has been so
clearly treated in a recent paper read before the Royal
United Service Institution by Captain I-Ioldich, R. E.,who
surveyed the region referred to, in 1880, that we quote
liberally as follows :
I n improving our very imperfect acquaintance, both with the present military resources and position of Russia in Central Asia, and of the difficulties
presented both geographically and by the national characteristics of the races
that she would have to encounter in a n advance south of the Oxns, a good
deal has been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the
turbulent tribes dwelling in a n d around Kabul, whose chief and lceenest interest always lies in that wl~ichbears, more or less directly, on their chances
of success in mere faction fights, which they seem to regard as the highest
occupation in life, thc Russian factor in the general game must be a matter
of coilstant discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual

*

1

A compressed ration of forage was extensively used by the Rnssians in
1878, weighing 3+ ponnds ; 5 days' supply could bc carried on the saclclle
with ease.
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interest in tl~eirr~ationnlpositiol~tllat there is no belter natural geograpl~er
III the ~vorltlthan tlic tlfgllan of the Iiabul district.
Tllcrc is often an exactncss about llis mctllod of imparting infor~llation (sometimes a careful
little map tlralvn o l ~ twit11 a pointed sticlc on the ground) \ v l ~ i c would
l~
strike
o r ~ ca'; altcgetl~erestraordinary, I)ut for the reflection that this one accolnplisl~mentis probably the practical outcome of the education of half a lifetime.
Rnssia's bases of military operatiol~stowards India are two : one on the
Caspian Sen at I<ras~~ovodak,
and Cl~ikisl~liar,
wit11 outposts at Chat aud
ICizil Arvnt; and the otl~eron thu line of Ichiva, Bol;l~;~ra,Samarcnnd, and
hlargillan, xvhic11 may roughly 11e said to represent the frontier l~eltl(together
xvitli a large extent of boiuldary soutl~of I<uldja) by the Army of Tasliliend.
under Geiicral Iiaufman~i. Gilt betmccn this latter line and tile Oxus,
Russia is undoobtedly :~lready tlie dominant Power. T h e meye fact of
Russia having already thorougl~lyexplored all these regions, gives her tlie
key to their future disposal. There is no doubt that in all nlatters relating
to the acquirement of geographical l<nowledge, where it bears 011 possible
military operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. H e r surveying
energies appear to be always concentmted on that which yet lies beyond her
reacl~,rather Lhan in . t h e completion of good maps to aid in the right
go\*cr~~nlent
of tllnt which llas already been acqnired.
With what lies north of the Osus we can have very little to say or to do ;
therefore it matters the less that in reality tve ltnow very little about it. The
Oxus is nol: a fordable river, At IClioja Saleli, wl~ichis the furthest point
supposed to have been reached by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile
,
wide, with R slow cnrrent. A t Charjui it is about the same w i d ~ h only
rapid and deep. At Iiarlti it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and
at ICilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But a t all these l~lncesthere are ferries,
and there woiild be ample means of crossing an army corps, if we Lake
inlo account both tlie Aral flotilla and the native material, in the shape of
large flat-botton~eclboats, capable of containills one 11u11dredmen each, used
for ferrying purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred bet\veen
IZilif and I-Iaznrasp. These boats are drawn across the river by horses
swimming tvilli ropes attached to their manes. But ,under any circumstances
it seems about as u~iIilielythat any British force mould oppose the passage
~ across the Oxus as that it would interfere with the Rusof a R u s s i a ~army
sian occupalion of the trans-Oxus districts ; but once south of tlie Oxus,
many new coaditions of opposition would come into play, arising principally
from tlie very different national characteristics of the southern races to those
farlher north. I t would no longer be a matter of pushing an advance

thro~iglisandy and waterless deserts, or over wild and rugged moootaills,
dificnlties whicl~in themselves have never yet retarded the aclvniicc of a
determined gcneral, but there would be the reception that any Cl~ristian foe would almost certainly meet at the h n ~ ~ of
d sn warli1;e ant1 powcrful
people, who can unite with all the cohesioll of religious fn~~aticism,
1)ncked
1111by something like nlilitary orgartization and a perfcct acq~ininta~~cc
with
the strategic21 co~lditionsof their country. Most probably there would be
110 s e r i o ~ ~
local
s opposition to the occupntion by Russia of n line extending
from 13alkh eastwards throng11 IChulm and I<unduz to Faizrrbad and Sarliadcl, all of which places csn be rcacl~edwithoot great dificulty from the
Oxus, and are con~lectedby excellent Intern1 road cornrnunications. But
the occupalio~~
of such a line could have but one possible ol)jcct, w l ~ i c l ~
wo111d )e to conceal the actual line of furtllcr advance. Each of tllesc
places may be said to dominate a pass to 111cliaover thc IIindoo Rilsl~. Opposite Sarliadd is the Bnroghil, lcading eitl~erto I<nsl~mir01. to RIastuj
and the ICuuar valley. Faizabnd commands the Nuksm Pass. I<li~~lnl
loolcs southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pnss into Rol~istan,wl~ilefrom
Balk11 two main routes diverge, onc to Bamian and Kabul, the other
t o Blaimaua and Ilerat.
I t would be n grcat mistake to siippose that this short list clisposes of all
the practicable passes over the I-Iiudoo I<iisl~. T11e mngc is a singularly welldeh~eclone tl~rongl~out
its vast length ; bot it is not by nny lucans n rnuge of
startling pcalcs and magnificent nltituclcs. I t is rntl~cra c11ain of vcry elevated flattish-toppecl hills, spreading down in long spnrs Lo t l ~ enorth and
in warm slieltercd vallcys a ~ smiling
~ d
corlicrs, affordsouth, abouncli~~g
ing more or lcss pasture even in its highest parts, and traversed by countless
paths. Many of these paths are followed by Iiuchis in tl~cirn11111tal~uigrations
southward, with their families and l~onseliolclgoocls piled u p in picturesque
heaps on their hardy camels, or with lnrgc herds of sheepand goats, in senrd~
of fresh pasturage. South of the Hiitdoo ICilsh we h1c1inost of the eastern
routes to our nortl~westfrontier to converge in one point, vcry ncnr to Jelalabad. There are certain routes existing bctween (lie Russian frontier a t ~ d
India which pass altogether east of this poil~t. T l ~ c r cis one whicl~can
be followed from Tashkencl to ICashgar, and over the liarnkoram mngc, and
another which runs by the Terek Pass to Snrl~add,and tl~cnceover the
Baroghilinto Icashmir ; but these routes have justly, and by allnost ~uiiversal
consent, bccn set aside as i~lvolvingdificultics of such obvious magnitude
that it wpuld b e unreasonable to suppose that ally army under competent
leadership could b e committed to them. The same might snrely be said of
the route by tlie Nuksan Pass into the valley of Cl~itraland tlie Kunar, tvhich
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Its length and intricacy
joins the IChyber route not far from Jelalabad.
alone, indepcnde~~tly
of the intractable nature of the tribes which border it
on cither side, and of the fact that: the Nulcsan Pass is only open for half the
year, would surely place it beyond tile consideration of any gcncral who
aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying an army
Lhrough it. West of ICafirstan across the Hindoo ICiish are, as we have saicl,
passes innumerable, but only three wl~ichnced b e regarded as practicable for
a n advancing force, all the olhers more or less converging into these three.
These are the KhLlc, the Iiaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and
tlle Irak. T h e Khblc leads from ICunduz via Ghori and the valley of
the Indarab to the ]lead of the Panjshir valley. Its elevation is about thirteen thousand fcet. I t is described as an easy pass, probably practicable for wheeled artillery. T h e Panjshiris are Tajalcs, and, like the,lCohistanis generally, are most bigoted Suniu Mohammedans. T h e rich and
highly cr~ltivatecl valley which they inl~abit. forms a grand highway
into ICohistan and ICoh Dahman ; b ~ i tnll this land of terraced vineyarcls and orchards, watcrccl by snow-cold streams from the picturesque
gorgcs nnd mountain passes of the EIindoo ICiish and Paghman monntains,
-this very garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to thc gates
of Icabul, is peopled hy the same fierce and turbulent race who ]lave ever
g t o the armies of the Arnirs, and who have rengiven the best f i ~ l ~ l i nmen
dered the position of Kabul a s the ruling capital of Afghanistan a matter of
necessity ; with their instincts of religious hostility, i t will probably b e
found that the Icohistani, ralller than the I-Iindoo Kfish, i s thc rcal barrier
belween the north and the south. T l ~ cSar Alanp o r Parwnn IJass lcads
directly from ICunduz and Gllnri to Charilcar and Kabul. I t is thc direct
military rontc bctween Afghan Turlcestan and the seat of the Afghan
Govcmment, but is not much uscd for trade. I t cannot b e much over
eleven tliousand feet elevation, and it is known to be an easy pass, though
somewhat deslitule of fuel and forage. The next route of importance 1s
that which leads from Balkh, via Bamian, to the Iralc Pass on the IIinrloo
ICr~sh,and into the upper watercourse of the I-Ielmund River, and thence
by the Unai over the Paghman range to ICabul. This is the great trade
route from the marlcets of Turlcestan and Central Asia generally to Kabul
a n d India. T h e Iral;, like the Parwan, is not nearly so high as has been
generally assumed, while the Unai is a notoriously easy pass. This route is
a t present very much beticr known t o the Russians, who have lately frequently traversed it, than to ourselves. L ~ k ethe P nrwan ant1 the IihLlc, it
is lialde to be closed for three o r four montl~sof the year by snow. During
the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late in December, and appear lo

be again free from snow about thc middle of April. Between these main
passes innu~nerabletracks follow the " durras," or lines of watercourse, over
the ridges of the I-Iincloo Ilirsh and Pag-hman, wl~ichafford easy passage to
men on foot and frequently also to " I<uchi " camels. These passes (so far
as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available for mountain
artillery wilh a very small expenditure of construclive labor and engineering
slcill. I n IZoh Dahman nearly every village of importance lying at the foot
of the eastern slopes of the Pagllman (such ns Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.)
covers n practicable pass over the Paghnian, which has its co~lti~luation
across
the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of the Hindoo 1EEsh beyond it.
But between the IChilc Pass and the Irak, the various routes across the
EIindoo ICtsh, whether regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although
they by n o means collverge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass withill
striking distance of a n army occupying Kabul. Snch a force would have,
first of all, thorougl~ly to secure its communication with the Oxus, and a
strong position a t Rabul itself.

Having the official statement of a military engineer wit11
reference to the Oxus-Hindu-Itoslz line, as a barrier or
base or curtain, we may pass to the principal approach t o
Herat from the northwest.
There are four distinct lines by which Russia could
move on Herat -:
I. From the Caxyian base a trans-Caucasian army corps
could move (only with the concurrence and alliance of
Persia) by the Mashed route direct ;
11. O r it could move outside Persian territory, from
Chi/2zkCzlinr b y the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and
would t h m have t o pass through Persian territory t o
Saralihs, or across the desert to Merv ;
111. From t h e Taxhhelzd--Boh/za~a
base a route exists
win Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv ; and there is
1V. Also the well-known road by 13nZkk and Mamiana,
direct t o Ilerat.
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Routes 111. ancl IV. having just been discussed, let us
look a t Routcs I. and 11.
Refcrriilg to the small outline map of t h e trans-Casp i a ~regiou, herewith, it will b e seen that troops could
embai-lc from Odcssa in tlle flcct of rnercllailt steamers
available, ancl, if not inolestcd r 7 ~7-0z~tpby llostile cruisers,
would rcach Batam in from 2 to 3 days, thcilce by
rail t o Bakh in 24 hours, another 24 hours tlli-ougll the
Caspian Sca to I<rasnovodsk, a transfcr in lighters t o the
landing at Micl~aclovsl~,
and tlle final rail tr;ulsportation
to t h c prcsent terminus of the traclc beyond Kizil A r v a t ;
this, it is said, will soon reach Aslrabad, 310 miles from
I-Ierat. T h e S c c r e t a ~ yof tllc Royal Asiatic Society, Mr.
Cust, with his wife, passcd ovcr this routc in 1883, and
testifies to t h e ease and comfort of thc transit and t o the
great number of vessels engagccl in tlie oil trade, which
are available for military purposes, both on t h e Black and
Caspian seas. H e cstimatcs that they could easily carry
8,000 inen a t a trip:%
General I-Iainley says: " Wc may assume t h a t if on
the railway (single track) t h c vcry rnoclcratc numbcr of 12
trains a day call run a t the ratc of 12 miles an hour, the
journey would occupy 40 hours. T h e successivc detachments would arrive, thcn, easily in two days a t Sai-alihs.

* Mr. Cust says : " T l ~ e r ea r e

Lhrce clnsscs of stealncrs on Lllc Cnspinn.
t h e Imperial wnr filcamcrs wit11 ~ v l l i c l Wussin
~
kccps dowrl piracy;
2, t h e stcnmcrs of tlic Cnncnsus ant1 Mcrcuiy C:umpany, very ~ ~ x u u c r o u
and
s
large vessels; 3, petrolcum vcsscls-each
stcan~crwith n cnl~ncity of 500
men."
Lecture before I<. U. S. Institution ( L o i ~ d o ~IY~R,I. ) ,
I,

t
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A division inay be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus,
in six days a division would be assemblcd at Saralths
ready to move on the advanced guard. A n army corps,
with all its equipments and departments, would bc conveyed in 165 trains in 17 days. I t would then bc ZOO
miles-another 17 days' march-from Herat. Thus, adding a day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps
from Bald would rcach Herat in 35 days. Also the advance of a corps from Turltestan upon Kabul is cvcn
morc practicable than before." *
The route from Tchikisl~liarvia Asterabad (where it
strikes the main Tcheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be at1
important auxiliary t o the railway line, 7,ia Asterabad.
There is also a more direct caravan track running south
of this across the I<horassan, from Asterabad (through
Shahrud, Aliabad, Icl~af, Gurinn) t o Hcrat ; or, a t
Shahrud, an excellcnt road running between thc two
already described straight (viaSabzawar and Nishapar) t o
Mashed.
From Saralths to Merv the road is said to be good and
fairly supplied with water. From Merv t o I-Ierat the
well-worn expression " coach and four " has been used t o
denote the excellcnt condition of the road.+' Yalatun

*

I n his plan of invasion, Slcobeleff thought 50,oco men might uildertalte
the enterprise witl~outfear of disaster. This forcc could be doubled from the
Caucasus alone.
t F o r Llle first IOO miles Lhc road follows the Mnrghab, which Abbott describes as " a deep stream of very pure water, about 60 feet in breadth, a i d
flouring in a channel mired to the dcplh cf 30 feet in the clay soil of the valley ; banlcs precipitous and friilged wit!l lamarislc and a few reeds."

is described as fertile, well populatecl, and ~ul~healthy.*
From Penjdch, whcrc the rivcr is so~netimesfordable, the
road follows thc Khusk River, and, ascending t h e Koh-iBaber Pass, descends into the Herat valley, immediately
beneath it. j-

*Band-i-Yalalun, or " barilt which throws the waters of the M n r g l ~ a binto
thc canal of Yalatun."
Belorc closing the chapter on the " Russian Forces," a brief clescription of the order of rnarcll custon~aryin Cenlral Asia may b e proper. From
a tr~lnslationby Major Clarltc, R. A , , from ICotcnsko's " Turlcestan," it appears that the horses accompanying Central Asian delachmcnts a r c s o considerable that the lalter form, as it were, the cscort of the former. As an
Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks from every sicde, the distribution of the
troops, during the march, must b e such that they may be able to repulse thc
enemy no matter where h e may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of
cavalry marches in advance at a distrnnce frorn $ to I$ miles, so a s t o be in
view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches a detncliment of sappcrs and a company o r two 01infantry ; then part of the artillcry ;
then more inrantry ; the train ; bchind the train, ren~ninderof artillcry and
inrantry ; as a rear guard, a sotnia of cavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are
usually cliosea at wells, anrl arc, in nlanyrespects, similar t o those customary
in the Indian country in America. First, an outer line of carts o r wagons ;
the11 the troops ; and inside, all the mlirnals. T h e accompanying diagram
is frolh The Jozrnzal Royrrl U~riiedScruice I?tsZifz6fiort(London).
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REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.

THEpurpose of this volumc has been t o give as much
rcliabl~il~forrnationupon the causc of tllc A~~glo-Russian
dispute, t h e nature of tllc probable thcatre of operations
in case of war, and of the armics of tllc I'owcrs co~m.x-ned,
as could b e obtained and pl-intcd within a single fortnight.
T h e ricl~nessof the available material made this especially
difficult, colnprising as i t did the rccord of ~-cccntcampaigns in Afghanistan, as well as the opiniol~sof those who,
lilte VambCry, Vcniukofl, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust,
are authorities upon Asiatic topics.
As these lines are written* thc civilizcd nations of the
world await with bated brcath the next sccne upon the
Afghan stage.
Seldom when two gladiators, armcd and stripped, enter
the arena does a doubt cxist as t o their purpose. Yet
such an exceptional uncertainty attends t h c prcscnce of
Englancl and Russia on tllc bordcr of Afghanistan.
A t least 50,000 British soldiers arc drawn up in front of
the Indus awaiting a signal from t l ~ c i rQuecn. Ncarly
twice that llumbcr of Russia11 troops arc rnasscd on

* April 18,1885.
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or near the northwestern angle of the Ameer's country.*
I t is ilnpossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of
the prescilt military situation, ccrtain political elements.
I t is apparcnt that the Russians near Herat stand practically at "the forlcs of the road " ; it is a three-pronged
fork-one branch runniilg cluc south to the sca and two
branches clue east to India. Thc first-naincd requires b u t
passing comment and oidy as it relates to Herat, planted
on a routc which ca~lilotbe controlled without i t s possession, for military and co~nmcrcialreasons well understood.
A s already explained, thc routes to India, available t o
Russia, enable hcr to move from her base on t h e MervHerat line, both via Ballth and Kabul, for the purpose of
flanking a British column moving from Quetta wcstward,
or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund ; from Turkestail above this route, a British force moviilg from ICabul to Ballth could also be threatened. By t h e main
Herat-I<andal~ar route an advance from the east could
also be directly opposed; t h e crossing of the I-Tclinund
b y either army would probably be contcsted.
In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Afghan, the first great battle would doubtless bc fought on
t h e ICandal~ar-Ghazni-Kabulline.

*

Since the everiis noted in our first chnptcr (page 12) Lranspircd, nnoiher
page has beell acldccl to Alglia~~isinn's
blood-slni~iedrecord. AfLer conlrontirig encl~ollicr on tlie IC1111slc River for some weeks a lnrge Russia11 forccunder
Gcncrnl IComarolC attacked (March 30, 1885) Lhc Afghan troops a t l'e~ijdeh,
and alter a gnllnnt rcsisiancc on Ll~cpar1 of tlie ualivc gnrrison it wns uitedy ronlccl and illc town occupietl l)y the victors. T l ~ cRussian cas~lalLies
were inconsicleral~le,but the Afglia~islost ncnrly 1,000 mc11.
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General 1-Iamley, the leading British military authority,*
shows that this linc is, of all proposed, at once the most
practicable ancl desirable line for the defence of India,-f
l I e says : " We should have a strong British governor in
I<andahar, and a strong British force on the I--Ielmund
and on the road to Kabul; the railway completed t o
Kandahar, ancl, in case of a movement from Turlccstan
against Icabul, a force on our side on its way to occupy
that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid
warlike populations. Surely therc can be no question as
to which of thcse two sets of circumstances would give
us most influence in Afghanistan, most power to oppose
Russia and t o maintain conficleilce in India." $
T h e same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulpll's
recomlneilclatioil t o utilize the strong natural positions

* Lieu(.-Gcacrnl Sir. E. Hamley, I<. C. I3.
,

Three lines had Ocen considered : first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani,
but tltis would leave the seaporl of 1Curracllee unprotected ; scconrl, from
Pishin northeast lo ICabul.
$ Gen. I-Iamley's remarlcs were made belorc the Royal Unitecl Service Institution (May 18, 1884), and, in the discussion which followed, Colonel
Malleson said: " Recently in India some influentin1 natives said to m e :
'Russia will continue hcr advance ; she ~villnot stop until she has gnincd the
ferlile country of Herat, and then s l ~ ewill i t ~ t r i g ~with
~ e the native princes
bel~indthe Indus, and when you send a n army to meet her, you will lind
those native ~ r i l ~ c rising
es
in your rear.' I may fortify my own expericncc by
what was told me by an Austrian gentlcnla~lwho visited Indta about seven
years ago. FIe paid a visit to the Mnl~oraja,of Cashmere, who said to l l i ~ n:
' From you I hope to get tile in1111 ; you arc liot an Englisliman nor a Russian. Tell me which is t l ~ cstronger-the Engli\l~power or the Russian ; 11ecause it will lie neccssaiily my duty, ~f Russia should advance, and if I should
lil~clRnssia stmtlgqr than England, to go for the defence of my throne on the
side of Russia. ' "

ncar Girishl; on the IIclmund. i l s to ~~fcr]l;lni.,t;ln
l l c 1~:stifics : " TVith a llower lilcc Russi:~closirlg 011 i t , llolcliilg
Pcrsia and Persian rcsourccs subject tcl its lvill, it is in
vain to think that Alghatlistan will I>c lolls i ~ ~ ( l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ n t
cvcn in namc. IL is bctwccn liarnmcr ancl a~l~.iI,
o~.,to 11sc
a still inorc cxprussivc metaphor, betn,ccll tll,: clc\-il :{,ld
the clccp sca. Ilouncl to us by no traditions, by 11o-;trorlg
political influences such as might have been usctl to constrain tllcm, thc Afgllan tribes, mcrcenclry nl~clI,crficlio~~s
to n proverb, an aggrcgatc of tribes-not a n:ltion,-n~ill
losc no tiinc, whcn tlle moment occurs, in siding tvitll thc
grcat power which promiscs most lavishly, or u ~ h i c lcan
~
lay strongest hold on thcn~."
T h e burning words with nrhich Gcncral IIamIcy closctl
his lecturc onc yiar ago arc singularly true trl-clay, a n d
form a fitting tcrmi~lationto this slictch :
" I do not undervalue thc many influctices ~ v h i c lwill
~
always opposc any policy cntniling expcnsc. I h t if tllc
prescnt qucstion is fo~lnclto he - IIolv shall we gu;lrrl
against a tcrrible inenace to our IntIinn IS~npil-u?any
cost to be incurred can hardly he ad~nittetl:is a reason
which ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trustfulncss in the virtue and guilclessncss of rival states; distrust and denunciation of a11 who woulcl chill this inverted
patriotism by words of warning; refusal of all lncnsurcs
demanding expense which do not promise n pccunin~y
return :--such is the kind of libcrality of sentirrlcnt which
may ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may

be vely excellctlt qualities, but they arc specially inapplicable t o dcalings with the wolf. Do those who s l ~ r i n k
from expense thinlt that the presence of Russia i n Afgllanistan will be illexpcnsivc t o u s ? Will the weakness
which will be t h e temptation and the opportunity of R u s sia be less costly than effectual defc~zce? When me e n t e r
t h e councils of Europe t o assert our most vital interests,
shall wc spealc as we havc bee11 accustomccl t o spealr,
when our free action is fettercd by thc ilnrniilcnt perpctua
menace t o India? Thcse are questions which, now p u t
forth to this linlited aucliencc, will, perhaps, ~vithin t h e
experience of most of us, be thunclered in the ears of t h e
nation. England is just now not without serious perplexities, but none are so fraught with possibilities of mischief as the storm which is now gathering on the A f g h a n
frontier."
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in the Sagasof Icclnnd and Greenland in relation to
iRe dis'coveries of the Northmen, nnci also thnt contallled in certain rare boolis, manuscripts, and maps, descriptive of the explorations of Columbus, thc Cabots, Cortereal,
.
Verrazznno, and othcr navih.ntors, to the year r g n g

. .

.

.

A HISTORY O F T H E THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

By ANTON
GIXDELY, Professor of German I-Iistory in the University of Prague.
y
TENBROOR, recently ProIessor of Mental
Translated l ~ ANDREW
Philosophy in the U~iiversityof Michigan. Second edition. T w o
volnmes, octavo, with maps and illustrations
,
$4 O?

.

.

LIFE AND T I M E S OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

By.the
H o n . JOHN L. STEVENS,
L L . D . , recetltly U n i t e d S t a t e s Minister to
Stockholm. 8v0, with n e w portrait engraved on s t e e l
$2 50

.

THE COMPLETE WORKS O F ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

Including his Contributions to the " Federalist."
Edited, with inCADQTLODGE.Seven volumes,
troduction and notes, by HENRY
handsomely printed from type, with two portraits engraved on steel.
Edition.limited to 500 copies.
CONTENTS.

I. Revolutionary. Governmentnndthe
V. Foreign Relations.
Co~~slitution.
VI. The Excise and Whiskey Rebellion.
11. Taxation and Finance.
Miscellaneous.
111. National Banlrs. Colnnge, Industry, VII. &Iiscellancous.
and Commerce.
VIII. Private Correspondence.
n7.F0reifi.n Relntlons.
1X. The Federalist.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS,

New York and London.

RECENT T R A V E L AND DESCRIPTIORI.
The Merv Oasis : Travels and Adventures East of the Gaspian during the Years 1819-'80-'81, Including Five
Months' Residence in the Telrkd Territory. By E. O'DONOVAN,correspondel~tof the L o r i n b ~ zDaiQ News. W i t h portrait, maps,
a n d fac-similes of diplomatic documents. 2 volumes, large octavo, $7.
'1 He tells hisstory with tlle ready pen of an experienced writer, and tlloughhis boo11
is a l a r ~ one
e it has no dull J I re!.."-Pyes.7,
~
Phila.
His style is extremely vlvih nnrl pictrlresqur his anecdotes are many nnd varied.
and his portraits of 'l'urcomans and ~'erslno; nre g~aphicand life-lilce lo the last
degree, d l t o ~ e t h e r the
.
I~oolcwill lulfil even Lllr high expectations which hnve been
naturally raised by tile letters to the Doily Nervs."-ALU AfdN Cnzet4, London.
"Mr. O'Donovnn's risit single-handed to the TekkB strongholtl d;ring n time of
wild excitenlentis an instnnce of daring to which we are precluded fro111applying the
harsh term 'fool.tu~rdinoss' by the excelte~~ce
of the prcsent boolr."-At/~ctzrem,
London.
Six Months in Persia. By EDWARD STACI~.2 volumes, octavo, with
seven elaborate maps, $4.50.
" A tvelcon~eaddition to our lcno%vledgeof this interesting but nlmost unknown
]and."-C/trislina Union.
~
author of " T h e Art
Italian Rambles. By JAMES J n c ~ t s oJARVES,
Ides," " Italian Sights," etc. 16m0, cloth extra, $1.25.
Cuban Sketches. By JAMES W. S'TEBLE. Oclavo, cloth extm, $1.50.
"The book ives a well-wr1tte11tnle of topics wlllch are of interest both to tourist
and to those w%o enjoy travelling at their own firesides."-Christin?~ Rc~ister.

MISS ISABELLA BIRD'S TRAVELS.
Unbeaten Tracks in Japan. By ISAJJELLA BIRD.
2 volumes, octavo, ftilly illust~.nled,$5.00.

L i b r a r y edition,
Popular editioli, I volume,

octavo, fully illustrnted, $3.00.
"Beyond question the most valuable and the mast interesting of recent boolcs conOne of the most profitable of recent travel
cerning japanese travel. + *
records.' -2Zwenirrg Post.

*

A Lady's Life in the Rocky Mountains.

12mo, cloth, illustrated,

$1.75
" Her whole experience is a singular combination of the natural nncl the drnmatic, as
well as the most encouraglng record of feminine confidcnce and masculine chivalrousness."-Spectator.

Six Months Amon the Palm Groves, Coral Reefs, and
Volcanoes of t%m Sandwich Ielands. Octavo, cloth, illus"

trated, $2.50.
Miss Bird is the ideal Tmvcller."-Lorrcio71 Sjectator.

The Golden Chersonese, and the W a y Thither.

Octavo, clolh,
with 24 illustrations, a n d 2 maps, $2.25,
Sltetches of trnvel in the Malayan Per~uisula.
"There never wns a more perfect traveller than Miss Blrd.
* Interesting
extracts could be rnatio from every page o f tile book + * * one of the cleverest
books of travel of the year,"-New l'ork Ti~rtes.

*

*

6.P. PUTNAM'S SONS, a7 & 89 West 23d St., New York.
18 Henrietta Street, Covekt Garden, London.

P U B LIC-4 TIONS OF G. P. P UTlVAiM'S SUNS.
A HISTORY O F T H E T H I R T Y YEARS' W A R . Dy Ax-roN
GINDELY,Professor of Gerlnnn IIistory in he University ~f Pmgue.
Tratlslated by ANDREWTENDI~OOK,
~.ecetltlyProlessor of I\Ieatal
Philosophy in the University of h l i c h i p n . ' Second Edilion. T\vo
volumes, octavo, with lnaps o~lclillustrations .
,
$4 00

.

This most important period of Europenn Ilislory, a riglit u~lderstnndill~
of ~vllicll
is essential to t h e propc: cnmprch-nsion of i?urope to-dny, has long ~ v a i t c dCur an Ilistorian. T h e work of "hill-r, while t h o r o ~ ~ h 'readable,
y
was written vithnut any specin:
historical prcp;lration, and nt :i t h e whcn thc collcclions of govcrnnlcnt arcllircs mcrc hot
accessil~lc. T l ~ clittle h:mdboolc of Gardincr is a most admirable summary, b u t ia too
condensed for gencrnl reading. I t is belicvcrl Lhat t h e present wurl;, which 112s bccn prc.
p r e d by an liistorinn of the highest position and autllority, and while thoruugbly t r ~ ~ s t .
worthy for the purposes of the scholar, is full of intcrest for tlie general reorlar, will nlcet
all the requirements, and will remain the authority on thesubject.
" M a y safely be pronounccd bctter than tlie best."-Dis.

of C h ~ i s l Cincinnati.
,

H i s portr:~itures are vividly dmwn, and his battle scencs are picturcd with great
realistic power."-Zioa's
IIemid.
"

" T h e clear style of the translntion makes t h e reading of the book not only easy
b u t deligl~tful."2Bt~iiefi~~,
Philadelphia.
" T h e translator has not only pcrlormcd his task in a mnsterly manner, but Ily his
presentation of this admirable work to English readers, has placed them under a debt of
obligation."-Arfinn J Press.
''Prof. Gindely has achieved true success in the historical line; h e llas a real
Hartford.
genius for such labors."-Post,
"Wonderfully well drawn."-Advocate, Cincinnati.
" I t will doubtless take its place at once as t h e work of standard anthority on tlie
subject."-Criiic
nrrd Good Literatztra.

Beyond all question t h e best history of t h e Thirty Years' War yet published."
-Phiin. Ife172.
I~ldispansahleto the student. For the general reader i t is one of the most picCoamnl.
turesque in history."-IYnri,4orJ
"Unquestionably tile best l~istoryof the T h i r t y Years' W a r that has ever been
written."-1Ynifi7rrore
A,nericnn.
Must take a high and permanent place in historical literature."-Brook@t~Eazie.
" I t is not the least of the services to the cause of right thinking that lias a t last
given us a history of this *eriod which bids fair to bring the two lines (scholarly and
popular thought) together.
,
I' I t would be hard to name a m o ~ l grecent works a more overwhelming indictment
of tile policy nnd methods of imperial Jesuitry-n more sntislactory statement of what the
Rolnan Papacy owes to the art aiid devotion of tlie Society of Jesus ; nor, w e may add, a
more thorough exposure of t h e hIacaulay romance, t h a t the Reformation in its spread followed the Snxon and Northern races, and proved unacceptable to ~ e o p l eof Romanic
descent. I-N. Y.I ~ ~ d e j e s d e n f .

" H e writes with the calmness of n pllilosopher and the correctness of 'a scholar.
and the work will taka rank w i t h the best histories of modern times."-Ilarrislurg
T#lcflunr.

PROSE MASTERPIECES FROM MODERN ESSAYISTS :comprising single specimen essays from Irving, Leigh I-lunt, I.amb,
D c Quinccy, Landor, Syclney Smilli, Thaclieray, Emcrson, Arnoltl, hIorlcy,
I-lelps, Icingslty, kusl;in, Lowell, Carlyle, Macaulay, ITroude, Frccninn.
Gladslone, Newman, Lcslie Stcphen. Thcse essays l ~ a v cbeen selccled
will1 rcferel~cet o presenting specitnens of the methocl of tl~ouglitand tlic
literary style of tltcir scveral writers, and also for the purpose of putting
into convcnicnt sliapc for direct comparison the treatment givcn b y siicli
writers to similar subjects.
THE Mv.rnnlL.1~~or; LiTannTunn, b y
Irvi~~g.
THEWoi:~.n nP noous, b y I-lunt.
~ ~ I L ' B I ( P I ! C TSVMI~A.~HIGS,
b y Lamb.
C o ~ v s n s ~ ~b yl oUc~ Quince
,
PETITION
OF ~ 1 1 1 . : TLIU<;S,
by E k o r .
131i~rr~1.r.s
~ 1 ;~',\I:LIAMENT,
by La~ldor.
FALLACIES,
b y Smith.
NII.NISIH O N ~ B Ib Thaclccray.
COMI~ENSATION
k;y grnerson.
SwlriTrN1~s.i,\Nb LIC.II.I.,
b y Arnold.
Po~~ur.aa
Crl~:runrc,by Morley.
Stephen.
Axr orr LIVING
W I ~ . B OTIIEIIS,
b y Helps.
3 vols., 161110,bcvclled boards, with frontispieces on steel, gilt
$I 25
Lop, i n box, cach
T h e set in extra cloth, with cloth box
,
,
4 50
T h e same in Russia-leather binding and casc, round corners,
red edges
10 00
,I.h e same, large paper cclition, wiLh portraits, cloth extra,
gilt top, rough edges
7 50
THE ESSAYS OF ELIA. By Charles Lamb. " T h e Temple
Edilioq." I-Iandsomcly printed o n laid paper from new type, xvilli etchings
by James D. Smillie, 1". S. Cliurcl~,R. Swain Gifford, and Charles A. Platt.
Octavo, cloth extra. Ahold
$4
The same, Islington Edition, 250 copies only, with proof iniprcssiou of
.
nz6szlcred, printed upon pure linen paper ; cloll~,
etchings on s i z i i ~ ~Quarto,
uucnt
$10 00
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS ; A MANUAL O F SUGGESTIONS FOR BEGINNERS I N LITERATURE : compti.sing a clescription of publishing metliods and anangcments, directions for thc
preparation of I I S S . for the press, cxp1an;itioiis of the details of l,oc~lc-manufncturing, with in.;tructions for proof-reading, and specimens of typcrgml~l~y,
tlie text of the United States Copyright Law and information co~rccrni~lg
International Copyrights, togctlter will1 general Iiints for nutliors. Occn~.o,
clothextra
$ 1 vo
''F~lllof vnll~ablelliformntion for aulllors nnrl wrltcrs. * * * A mosl instructi\.c
* * * nnd cxccllent mnnua1,"-//at$r?-'r A/orrt/rljl (Easy Chair).
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G. P. P U T N A M ' S S O N S , P U B L I S H E R S ,
NEW YORK AND LONDON.

